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I. Introduction

Courts around the country enter pretrial confidentiality
orders every day.1 Commentators and courts have long debated
the impact of court confidentiality on public safety. 2 This debate
often centers on whether public harms flow from court orders
that limit the audience for discovery information that those
same courts order parties to produce. 3 But an underexplored
aspect of pretrial confidentiality is the cost it imposes on the
litigation system. Confidentiality orders that prevent litigants
in similar cases from sharing information make litigation less
efficient and less effective.4 Courts are split on if, when, and how
1. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(g) (allowing protective orders to limit access
to trade secrets and other proprietary information); see also, e.g., Laurie Kratky
Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use of Limits of Confidentiality in Pursuit of
Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 285 (1999) (noting the frequent use of
confidentiality in civil litigation).
2. Compare Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order
Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6–9 (1983) (chronicling the intrusive nature of
civil discovery and observing that parties have legitimate reasons to keep
discovery information private), and Richard P. Campbell, The Protective Order
in Products Liability Litigation: Safeguard or Misnomer?, 31 B.C. L. REV. 771,
772–75 (1990) (contending that privacy interests should trump public and party
interests broader dissemination of pretrial discovery), with Dore, supra note 1,
at 296 (noting the view that courts are “publicly funded” and “accountable to
and guardians of a broader public interest”), Richard Zitrin, The Judicial
Function: Justice Between the Parties, or a Broader Public Interest?, 32 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1565, 1567 (2004) (contending that private dispute resolution is just one
function of courts; they also have a significant public function), Joseph F.
Anderson, Jr., Secrecy in the Courts: At the Tipping Point?, 53 VILL. L. REV. 811,
813 (2008) (noting that “[t]he debate over ‘court-ordered’ secrecy has festered for
several decades” and concluding that more court transparency is needed), and
Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 1508 Before the Subcomm.
on Commercial & Admin. Law Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2009)
(testimony of Leslie A. Bailey, Staff Att’y, Public Justice) (“In short, through
protective orders, secret settlements, and sealed court records, the public courts
are being used by private parties to hide smoking-gun evidence of wrongdoing.”).
3. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 2, at 811–12 (recounting a fatal accident
stemming from allegedly faulty tires where information about the defect,
potentially available from over two hundred related lawsuits, was kept from
victims by confidentiality orders).
4. See, e.g., Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 580 (D. Colo. 1982)
(determining that to deny sharing between litigants “would be tantamount to
holding that each litigant who wishes to ride a taxi to court must undertake the
expense of inventing the wheel”).
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these orders should allow litigants to share pretrial discovery
information.5
This Article examines the systemic harms of confidentiality
orders and contends that courts should exercise their discretion
to allow information sharing between similar cases absent
substantial evidence of countervailing factors. It is the first
significant piece of legal scholarship to examine court
confidentiality and discovery sharing in light of the recent and
contentious proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, approved in May 2014 by the Federal Judicial
Conference Standing Committee.6
The current General Motors defective-ignition crisis provides
a contemporary example of the potential systemic impact of
restrictive confidentiality orders. While many rightly focus on the
potential impact of court confidentiality on public safety,7 court
orders also likely prevented some of the plaintiffs in virtually
identical lawsuits from sharing discovery information with each
other. By “silo-ing” discovery information in this way, G.M. (like
many other litigants engaged in national-scale litigation) forced

5. Compare Long v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc., No. CV-09-2209-PHXDGC, 2010 WL 1740831, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010) (denying request for
sharing provision in protective order out of preference for later intervention and
modification), and Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P. v. Endicott, 81 So. 3d 486, 490 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (denying request for discovery-sharing provision based on
conflict with state trade-secret statute), with Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343,
346 (Tex. 1987) (mandating discovery-sharing provision in protective order
absent showing of prejudice to producing party), and Raymond Handling
Concepts Corp. v. Super. Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885, 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(allowing trial court discretion to include discovery-sharing provision).
6. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, REPORT TO THE STANDING
COMMITTEE 91–94 (May 2, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd
Policies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Standing/ST2014-05.pdf [hereinafter COMMITTEE
REPORT] (enumerating proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure); Tera E. Brostoff, Changes to E-Discovery Approved; “It Should Work,”
Professor Predicts, 82 U.S.L.W. 1918 (June 2, 2014) (discussing the rationale
behind the amendments to Rule 37 and predicting the effectiveness of the new
rule).
7. See, e.g., Bill Vlasic, Inquiry by G.M. Is Said to Focus on Its Lawyers,
N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2014, at A1 (“G.M.’s unwillingness to share information it
had about defective switches with regulators most likely cost lives in
accidents.”).
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its opponents to wastefully reinvent the wheel when conducting
discovery in each case.8
Indeed, plaintiffs with identical discovery requests in two
virtually identical cases might be forced to litigate their
entitlement to the same information anew in both cases. If courts
in similar cases simply allowed parties to share discovery, the
twin lawsuits would consume fewer court and party resources.9
Multiplied over many cases and many document requests, court
orders that prevent sharing create a significant drag on the
system. Based on these efficiency concerns, most commentators
that have considered the issue support some form of discovery
sharing.10
Surprisingly, however, courts are still split on the propriety
of protective-order provisions that allow information sharing
between similar cases.11 Some courts have mandated discovery
sharing, holding that courts abuse their discretion by issuing
orders that prevent the practice.12 At the other end of the
spectrum, some courts have recently held that discovery-sharing
provisions are forbidden in many cases.13 Indeed, federal and
8. Cf., e.g., Garcia, 734 S.W.2d at 346–48 (finding that nonsharing
protective orders, in the products liability context, create inefficiency by forcing
parties to conduct discovery without the benefit of information from previous
cases).
9. See, e.g., id. at 347 (“In addition to making discovery more truthful,
shared discovery makes the system itself more efficient.”).
10. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy,
1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 464–66, 466 n.61, 495–96 (cataloguing pro-sharing
action by the legislatures and an ABA commission while endorsing discovery
sharing); Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access
to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 498–99 (1991) (favoring discovery sharing
when it actually promotes efficiency); Dore, supra note 1, at 363–65 (same).
11. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 5 (listing numerous cases in which
courts have come to differing conclusions concerning protective orders).
12. See Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 346–48 (Tex. 1987) (“The facts of
this case do not justify the blanket protective order, and in rendering an
overbroad order, the trial court abused its discretion.”).
13. See Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P. v. Endicott, 81 So. 3d 486, 490 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2011) (denying a motion for a protective order on the grounds that it
would allow dissemination of trade secrets in violation of a state statute); cf.
Long v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc., No. CV-09-2209-PHX-DGC, 2010 WL
1740831, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010) (finding that the presumption of public
access “is trumped where the defendant establishes good cause to protect
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state courts across the country, applying similar protective-order
rules, are increasingly fractured on the issue.
The dispute about discovery sharing is particularly curious in
the face of recent and ongoing procedural reform designed to
make pretrial litigation more efficient. In late May 2014, the
Federal Judicial Conference Standing Committee on the Rules of
Practice and Procedure approved significant revisions to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26 to reduce the systemic burdens of
pretrial discovery.14 These proposed amendments are almost
certain to become law in December 2015.
The centerpiece of the changes would highlight the concept of
“proportionality” as the scope of discovery.15 Proportionality is the
notion that resources expended on discovery in a given case
should correlate with the benefits of conducting the discovery.16
Notably, the proposed amendments are silent about
discovery sharing.17 But sharing works in tandem with
proportionality by allowing parties to more accurately tailor
discovery in cases where the parties are informed by shared
information. Indeed, the crux of the amendments’ letter and
spirit—minimizing the undue burdens of pretrial discovery18—
discovery materials”).
14. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 63–72 (detailing proposed
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Brostoff, supra note 6
(describing the rationale behind adopting certain amendments to the rules:
“focusing on the goals of cooperation, proportionality and early case
management”).
15. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 65 (incorporating
proportionality as Rule 26(b)(1) scope of discovery).
16. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (limiting discovery when “the burden
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues”); see also 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2036 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the rationale
behind Rule 26(b)(2)(C)’s prohibition on “disproportionate discovery demands”);
Richard Marcus, Procedural Postcard from America, 1 RUSS. L.J. 9, 19–20 (2013)
(comparing American notions of proportional discovery with European norms).
17. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 80–86.
18. See id. at 82 (“The objective is to guard against redundant or
disproportionate discovery by giving the court authority to reduce the amount of
discovery that may be directed to matters that are otherwise proper subjects of
inquiry.”).
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stands in stark contrast to decisions that require parties to craft
discovery requests in the dark and re-litigate the same discovery
issues in virtually identical cases.
Beyond the extent to which discovery sharing complements
recent procedural reform efforts, it also has many collateral
benefits, including increased litigation integrity through
transparency along with, in at least some cases, increased
accountability for wrongdoing.19
Part II of this Article examines the court-confidentiality
problem and its relationship to discovery sharing. Part III
examines historical and contemporary trends in pretrial
discovery and their relationship to court confidentiality and
discovery sharing. Then, in Part IV, the Article proposes some
baseline discovery-sharing principles and examines the potential
interaction between these principles and the current proposed
amendments to the civil rules.
II. Court Confidentiality
Popular wisdom holds that courts are open to the public. As
Atticus Finch presented his unforgettable closing argument in To
Kill a Mockingbird, spectators watched from packed galleries.20
Though unjustly divided by race between the lower gallery and
the balcony, they observed both the presentation of evidence in
the trial and the unjust conviction of Atticus’s client.21

19. See, e.g., Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. 1987) (“Shared
discovery is an effective means to insure full and fair disclosure. Parties subject
to a number of suits concerning the same subject matter are forced to be
consistent in their responses by the knowledge that their opponents can
compare those responses.”); Dore, supra note 1, at 363–65 (recognizing implicitly
that shared disclosure may increase accountability by noting that “[t]he desire
to shield oneself from other potential claims, however, does not alone justify”
objection to discovery sharing).
20. See HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 186–87, 229–35 (Harper 2002)
(describing the overflowing public courtroom, indicating that not even standing
room remained to watch the case unfold); see also TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD
(Universal Studios 1962) (using the packed courtroom, open to the public, to
demonstrate that the case had grasped the attention of the public).
21. LEE, supra note 20, at 240.
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Popular notions of openness aside, the idea that courts and
their processes are open to the public is only partially accurate.
While a modern public would no doubt have a constitutional right
of access to a criminal or civil trial, much of what takes place in
litigation is not open to public view. In particular, civil discovery
is often kept confidential through a procedural device known as a
protective order.22 And because many cases settle during
discovery and before trial, the general public and other litigants
involved in virtually identical cases have limited access to
pretrial discovery information.23
Confidentiality in litigation, however, comes at a cost.
According to pro-transparency advocates, keeping public health
and safety hazards confidential costs lives.24 Beyond the public
safety issue, litigating individual cases in isolation has a systemic
impact. Indeed, some have argued that the court system is made
more expensive and less effective when those same pretrial
confidentiality orders forbid litigants from sharing discovery in
one case with litigants in other virtually identical cases.25

22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(g) (permitting a court to issue a protective
order to ensure that “a trade secret or other confidential research, development,
or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified
way”); see also Judith Resnick, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and
Celebration of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 PENN. L. REV.
1793, 1814–17 (2014) (describing declining public access to once-public court
functions, including pretrial discovery).
23. See, e.g., Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the
Rules Governing Public Access to Information Generated Through Litigation, 81
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375, 401–02 (2006) (noting that much “litigant-centered”
information, like discovery, generated through court processes is often kept from
the public); see also Richard A. Zitrin, The Laudable South Carolina Rules Must
Be Broadened, 55 S.C. L. REV. 883, 886–87 (2004) (describing the lack of judicial
awareness of lawyer-driven secrecy through discovery and settlements occurring
outside the view of the court).
24. See Zitrin, supra note 2, at 1565–66 (describing a particular case in
which a plaintiff’s attorney, after agreeing to a “secretized” settlement,
“[acknowledged] that others may have died later as a consequence” of the
confidentiality).
25. Cf. Dore, supra note 1, at 363 (“Discovery sharing, while arguably
undermining the efficiency of discovery in the immediate lawsuit, potentially
avoids the wasteful duplication of discovery in collateral litigation, thereby
ultimately advancing the efficient resolution of disputes.”).

2188

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181 (2014)

As a prefatory matter, I choose the word “confidential”
carefully here. Terminology in the confidentiality debate can
carry a loaded meaning.26 Proponents of more confidentiality, for
instance, often refer to the issue as one of “privacy.”27 Likewise,
those who favor more public access to discovery materials
typically refer to the issue in terms of “secrecy.”28 In this Article, I
refer to those in favor of less public access as “pro-confidentiality”
and those in favor of more public access as “pro-transparency,”
recognizing that neither term connotes those positions with
perfect neutrality.29
The following subparts explore the basic protective-order
framework in the American system and narrower, yet significant,
problems stemming from the use of pretrial protective orders to
stifle discovery sharing.
A. Pretrial Protective Orders
For more than three decades, courts, scholars, and legislators
have debated the impact of court confidentiality. For the most
part, the discussion has centered on public access and the tension
between the idea that courts are public institutions that express
public values and the notion that litigants do not sacrifice all
privacy at the courthouse door.30 And while it is difficult to
calculate precisely which side has the momentum, it is
undeniable that pretrial confidentiality is a feature of modern
litigation.31
26. Cf. Nancy S. Marder, Introduction to Secrecy in Litigation, 81 CHI.KENT L. REV. 305, 305 (2006) (suggesting a court-confidentiality vocabulary).
27. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 2, at 15 (observing the “privacy afforded
pretrial proceedings” through protective orders). But cf. Marcus, supra note 10,
at 457 (referring to the issue as “The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy”).
28. See, e.g., Zitrin, supra note 2, at 1572 (“In the last five years, secrecy in
settlements has become an increasingly common subject of articles in the
popular legal press and more scholarly forums.”).
29. See Marder, supra note 26, at 305 (describing the connotations
associated with certain “loaded terms” often used when addressing the issue of
confidentiality in discovery).
30. See sources cited supra note 2 (listing works of scholarship
exemplifying the debate surrounding privacy in discovery).
31. See, e.g., Dore, supra note 1, at 285 (observing that secrecy is a part of
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The confidentiality problem is typically framed as pitting the
public’s interest in knowing against the litigant’s interest in
confidentiality. In reality, this false binary oversimplifies the
problem and ignores a third category affected by court
confidentiality—litigants in separate but similar cases.32 This
group occupies a special position, with distinct interests in
accessing discovery information but still regularly excluded from
access by confidentiality orders.33
The trend of keeping pretrial litigation information
confidential from both the public at large and other similar
litigants pervades all aspects of the trial process. Before trial,
courts and attorneys working on behalf of litigants liberally
employ confidentiality orders to closet pretrial discovery from
anyone outside of each particular case.34
Many of these cases settle, and settlement agreements often
contain court-enforceable gag provisions that extend the original
confidentiality orders indefinitely.35 These agreements, like the
orders that precede them, often include “return-or-destroy”
provisions that require the parties to return or destroy all
discovery information in the case within a few months of
settlement.36 These mechanisms make it more difficult for the
every phase of civil litigation).
32. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 10, at 493–94 (discussing “access for other
litigants”).
33. Cf., e.g., id. (summarizing steps being taken to improve access to
confidential material produced during discovery for similarly situated litigants).
34. See, e.g., Dore, supra note 1, at 332 (“To expedite discovery and avoid
repeated motions for a protective order regarding every document believed to be
confidential, parties will frequently agree to, and courts will regularly issue,
umbrella protective orders.”).
35. See, e.g., id. at 290–92 (cataloguing the Civil Rules explicit bent toward
settling cases); Anderson, supra note 2, at 813 (describing, from a federal judge’s
perspective, the “take it or leave it” approach of some parties in getting courts to
ratify secret settlements through court order).
36. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 2, at 814 (describing requests from one
or both of the parties to enter orders with “return or destroy” provisions). Even
if relevant material is returned to the producing party, that party very well may
have a duty to preserve it for future litigation. See, e.g., 8A WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 16, § 2284.1 n.4 (discussing the possible sources of an obligation to preserve
information within control of a party). Compliance with that duty, however, is
made more difficult to police when protective orders force the return or
destruction of the material by opposing parties.
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general public and litigants in similar cases to obtain the
information. Even in cases that make it to trial, some courts have
recently, and inexplicably, sealed trial testimony and exhibits
from public view.37
Almost all facets of the broader court-confidentiality problem
stem from a common root—protective orders. Confidential
discovery, via protective orders, takes place in many cases that
are ultimately settled.38 If parties were unable to keep
information exchanged in discovery secret in the first place,
secret settlements would be largely ineffective.39 As a result, it is
not surprising that the early confidentiality controversy centered
on appropriateness of protective orders.
The term “protective order” actually describes several related
procedural devices that limit discovery.40 But the type of
protective order most relevant to the court-confidentiality debate
allows courts to limit the persons to whom discovery information
may be disclosed.41 To guarantee the confidentiality of pretrial
discovery materials, these orders are necessary because parties
may freely disseminate anything they learn in discovery to the
public at large, absent a contrary court order.
Described in Rule 26(c)(1)(g), these audience-limiting orders
mandate that “a trade secret or other confidential research,
37. See, e.g., Idar v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. C-10-217, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 77568, at *4 (S.D. Tex. July 18, 2011) (permitting third-party
intervenors to obtain documents produced by defendant in the current case,
conditioned upon signing the parties’ confidentiality agreement, and denying
access to exhibits produced by defendant in previous case under a different
protective order).
38. See Dore, supra note 1, at 384–85 (describing the relationship between
confidentiality and settlement).
39. See id. at 384 (“Secrecy undoubtedly facilitates the settlement process,
and in some cases, compromise could not be reached without some assurance of
its confidentiality.”).
40. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(a)–(g) (enumerating various examples of
“good cause” for a court to grant a protective order); see also 8A WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 16, § 2036 (stating that “a court is not limited to the eight specified
types of orders” enumerated in Rule 26(c)).
41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(g) (allowing court use of a protective order to
prevent sensitive commercial information from being disseminated to
competitors); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(f) (allowing courts to seal
depositions).
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development, or commercial information not be revealed or be
revealed only in a specified way.”42 A particular order under this
provision might limit disclosure of discovery materials to just
those participating in the litigation—the parties, their attorneys,
support staff, and experts.43 A more onerous, and rare, version
restricts access to only attorneys and consultants—precluding
even parties from having access to particularly sensitive
information.44
The defining feature of an audience-limiting protective order
is that it allows discovery to go forward while simultaneously
limiting the audience for the materials. In a way, this type of
order might be viewed as a pragmatic middle ground.45
Implicit in the protective-order arrangement is the notion
that the primary purpose of discovery is to prepare and resolve
litigation.46 Protective orders are often geared to steer discovery
information to the appropriate audience for this purpose, even at
the expense of other legitimate audiences.47
Nevertheless, under Rule 26, confidentiality is not automatic
or an entitlement. Indeed, like other protective orders, Rule
26(c)(1)(g) confidentiality orders may be entered only on a
showing of “good cause.”48 Under the best formulations of good
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(g).
43. See Dore, supra note 1, at 327 (“Courts, for example, may restrict the
disclosure of such discovery to designated persons or forbid its use for purposes
unrelated to the preparation and settlement of the case at hand.”).
44. See, e.g., Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1472
(9th Cir. 1992) (finding a protective order that denied access to party’s in-house
counsel was not an abuse of discretion).
45. Cf. Marcus, supra note 10, at 484–85 (observing that a broad right of
public access to discovery information would disrupt discovery).
46. Cf. Marcus, supra note 2, at 7 (contending that those involved in the
litigation system operate under “the assumption that any use of discovery
materials except to prepare for trial is inappropriate”). But see Dustin B.
Benham, Dirty Secrets: The First Amendment in Protective-Order Litigation, 35
CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1808 (2014) (acknowledging that the primary purpose of
discovery is to prepare for trial but observing that “[e]ven in private litigation,
parties openly use the system to obtain information” among other collateral
purposes).
47. See Benham, supra note 46, at 1806–08 (arguing that the dissemination
of discovery information is protected expression).
48. See, e.g., Pia v. Supernova Media, Inc., 275 F.R.D. 559, 560 (D. Utah
2011) (“Under the rule, the party seeking protection has the burden to show
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cause, a party seeking a protective order must make a
particularized showing of both the confidential nature of the
information and the harm that would flow from publicly
disclosing it.49 Conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific
evidence, will not justify an order.50
Still, trial courts have inarguably broad discretion in finding
good cause and fashioning protective orders, “frequently finding
protection justified, and frequently denying protection.”51 Even
discretion, however, has its limits. Multiple courts have
articulated good cause factors to provide at least a minimal
structure.52
But in practice, the good cause standard has proven to be
largely friendly to routine confidentiality requests, allowing many
good cause for preventing dissemination of discovery materials.”).
49. See, e.g., Gelb v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 813 F. Supp. 1022, 1034 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (“With respect to [a] claim of confidential business information, [the good
cause] standard demands that the company prove that disclosure will result in a
clearly defined and very serious injury to its business.”); Parsons v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 726 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (finding the “good cause” requirement
“to mean that the party seeking the protective order must demonstrate that the
material sought to be protected is confidential and that disclosure will create a
competitive disadvantage for the party”).
50. See, e.g., Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir.
1995) (“‘Good cause’ is established when it is specifically demonstrated that
disclosure will cause a clearly defined and serious injury. Broad allegations of
harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples, however, will not suffice.”); cf. 8A
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2035 (“The courts have insisted on a particular
and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and
conclusory statements, in order to establish good cause.”); Richard L. Marcus, A
Modest Proposal: Recognizing (at Last) that the Federal Rules Do Not Declare
that Discovery Is Presumptively Public, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331, 348 (2006)
(noting that the standards for issuing protective orders are “somewhat exacting”
but also contending that the substantial burden for obtaining a protective order
does not imply public right of access in the absence of one).
51. 8A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2043.
52. See, e.g., In re Roman Catholic Archbishop, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir.
2011) (balancing the factors enumerated in Glenmede Trust Co. to determine
whether a party has shown “good cause”); Glenmede Trust Co., 56 F.3d at 483
(enumerating several factors, “which are neither mandatory nor exhaustive,
that may be considered in evaluating whether ‘good cause’ exists”); Mosaid
Techs., Inc. v. LSI Corp., 878 F. Supp. 2d 503, 508 (D. Del. 2012) (“Assessing
whether good cause exists to seal a judicial transcript generally involves a
balancing process, in which courts weigh the harm of disclosing information
against the importance of disclosure to the public.”).
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courts to enter protective orders as a matter of course in complex
cases.53 Other courts have recently gone as far as creating a
standing protective-order form to which the parties may
stipulate, standardizing the rubber-stamp process.54
B. Fault Lines in the Protective-Order Debate
In response to a system that makes it easy to conceal
discovery information, pro-transparency advocates have waged a
multi-decade, multi-faceted campaign against protective orders.
In large measure, these efforts have focused on public access
questions,55 largely ignoring the impact of court confidentiality on
the litigation system. Up to this point, the fight has primarily
revolved around three axes: a First Amendment challenge, a rulebased right of access argument, and transparency legislation.
One early line of attack against pretrial protective orders
was founded in the First Amendment.56 In the late 1970s, protransparency advocates urged a First Amendment basis for
resisting protective orders: court orders restricting what litigants
do with information that they obtained in discovery allegedly

53. See, e.g., Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of
the Court: The Case Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711,
715 (2004) (contending, that to a federal district judge, “courts too often rubberstamp confidentiality orders presented to them, sometimes altogether ignoring
or merely giving lip service to the body of law and existing court rules that are
supposed to apply when the parties request that discovery documents be filed
under seal”); see also Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 785 (3d Cir.
1994) (observing the trend of some courts to enter protective orders as a matter
of course “without considering the propriety of such orders, or the countervailing
public interests which are sacrificed by the orders”).
54. See Model Protective Orders, U.S. DIST. COURT N. DIST. CAL.,
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/model-protective-orders (last visited Nov. 19,
2014) (providing “court-approved model forms” for protective orders) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
55. See, e.g., Zitrin, supra note 2, at 1567 (arguing in favor of transparency
on the grounds that “[o]nce the disputants go to court, the public nature of the
forum trumps the formerly private nature of the dispute”).
56. For a full analysis of the current relationship between the First
Amendment and pretrial protective orders, see generally Benham, supra note
46, at 1785–86.
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violated the Constitution’s free-speech guarantee.57 Early cases
considering the argument suggested that confidentiality orders
did not violate the First Amendment.58
But in 1979, the D.C. Circuit entered the fray and set off a
firestorm by applying strict scrutiny to invalidate a protective
order.59 If this view prevailed, many protective orders would be
doomed. The Supreme Court, in Seattle Times v. Rhinehart,60
responded. Justice Lewis Powell, writing for a unanimous court,
rejected the D.C. Circuit’s strict-scrutiny approach and instead
held that, although the First Amendment did protect those who
disclose discovery information, the special context of civil
litigation implicated free-speech concerns to a lesser extent than
in other contexts.61 While courts and commentators continue to
debate the meaning of the case,62 multiple courts have held that
Seattle Times effectively removed the First Amendment from the
protective-order analysis.63
57. Cf., e.g., Michael Dore, Confidentiality Orders—The Proper Role of the
Courts in Providing Confidential Treatment for Information Disclosed Through
the Pre-Trial Discovery Process, 14 N. ENG. L. REV. 1, 10–14 (1978) (examining
the role of the First Amendment regarding protective orders).
58. See Int’l Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 1963) (“[W]e
entertain no doubt as to the constitutionality of a rule allowing a federal court to
forbid the publicizing, in advance of trial, of information obtained by one party
from another by use of the court’s process.”).
59. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“Even if the order
is relatively narrow, however, it restrains the petitioner from communicating
matters of public importance for an indefinite period of time. As such it
constitutes direct governmental action limiting speech and must be carefully
scrutinized in light of the first amendment.”).
60. 476 U.S. 20 (1984).
61. See id. at 37 (“[W]here . . . a protective order is entered on a showing of
good cause as required by Rule 26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial civil
discovery, and does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained
from other sources, it does not offend the First Amendment.”).
62. See, e.g., Benham, supra note 46, at 1804–14 (arguing that protective
orders implicate significant First Amendment concerns).
63. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 462–63 (“[A]ll are agreed that the broad
[First Amendment] prior restraint argument that captured attention in the
early 1980s no longer has force.”). Compare Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785
F.2d 1108, 1114 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that “[d]espite the Supreme Court’s
apparent endorsement in the above passage of a least restrictive means
analysis, its holding requires only a good cause analysis”), with Anderson v.
Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7 n.2 (1st Cir. 1986) (interpreting Seattle Times to
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Soon after the Court decided Seattle Times, a few
commentators and courts cited the case to preclude discovery
sharing between similar litigants.64 That approach has been
roundly rejected because the case simply did not address the
propriety of sharing.65 Indeed, if anything, courts allowing
discovery sharing would impose a lesser speech restriction on
litigants than that approved by the Seattle Times court.66
On another front in the court-confidentiality fight,
transparency proponents have also contended that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure create a right of third-party access to
discovery materials.67 Under a previous version of Rule 5(d), all
discovery materials had to be filed with the court.68 The
reasoning went that the public had a common-law right to access
the unsealed contents of a court file.69 Because discovery was on
apply “heightened” scrutiny to the practice of issuing protective orders and
allowing some role for the First Amendment in the granting of particular
protective orders). But see Benham, supra note 46, at 1804–14 (“The Supreme
Court’s opinion in Seattle Times, recent Court statements, and an assessment of
the nature of both protective orders and the speech that they restrict make clear
that so-called intermediate scrutiny applies”).
64. See, e.g., Rich Arthurs, Defendants Fight Back on Data Sharing, LEGAL
TIMES, July 16, 1984, at 1 (describing Ford Motor Company’s attempt to use
trade secret protection to prevent plaintiffs’ attorneys from sharing crash test
data); Gary L. Wilson, Note, Seattle Times: What Effect on Discovery Sharing?,
1985 WIS. L. REV. 1055, 1056–57 (noting that the first court to apply Seattle
Times “relied on the rationales enunciated by the Supreme Court and granted a
protective order prohibiting the dissemination of discovered information to
parties involved in similar litigation”).
65. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 10, at 495 (“[I]t is difficult to see how the
[Seattle Times] Court’s reasoning should prompt other courts to curtail access
for use in other litigation.”).
66. See Benham, supra note 46, at 1823 (explaining that courts utilize
sharing protective orders to allow litigants to share discovery with litigants in
similar cases).
67. See Seymour Moskowitz, Discovering Discovery: Non-Party Access to
Pretrial Information in the Federal Courts 1938–2006, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 817,
865–75 (2007) (arguing that a presumption of access to discovery material was
“created by the combination of the Rule 5(d) filing requirement and the Rule 26
good cause provision”).
68. For a thorough history of changes to Rule 5(d) and the implications for
access arguments, see id. at 833–53.
69. See id. at 861–64 (observing that a general right to inspect and copy
both judicial and public records and documents existed).
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file, or supposed to be, the public had a putative right to access
depositions, interrogatory responses, and other discovery
responses.70
A series of rules amendments, culminating in a 2000
amendment that forbids parties from filing discovery unless in
connection with a proceeding or pursuant to a court order,71
effectively ended the Rule 5-based argument for a right of access
to unfiled discovery.72
Transparency, or “Sunshine,” legislation is yet another front
in the fight against protective orders. For more than a decade, the
Sunshine in Litigation Act has been filed, and re-filed, in both
branches of Congress but has never become law.73 Indeed, in May
2014, Senators Blumenthal and Graham reintroduced the
legislation as the Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2014 (SILA
2014).74
The current act would require district courts to consider the
health and safety implications of both protective orders (even
agreed protective orders) and settlement agreements before
approving them.75 In particular, courts could not approve
70. See, e.g., Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1978)
(“As a general proposition, pretrial discovery must take place in the public
unless compelling reasons exist for denying the public access to the
proceedings.”).
71. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d) (2000).
72. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 50, at 333 (“[A]mendments to the Rules
that forbid the filing of most discovery in court . . . further support the proposal
that the notion of the Rules themselves commanding public access should be
laid to rest.”). But see generally Moskowitz, supra note 67 (indicating a
presumption of access to discovery materials).
73. See Mary Elizabeth Keaney, Note, Don’t Steal My Sunshine:
Deconstructing the Flawed Presumption of Privacy for Unfiled Documents
Exchanged During Discovery, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 795, 798 (2011) (noting that the
bill was originally introduced in 1993 by Senator Herbert Kohl, and it has been
reintroduced annually ever since).
74. S. 2364, 113th Cong. (2014).
75. See id. § 2 (as introduced by Senate, May 20, 2014)
Amends the federal judicial code to prohibit a court, in any civil
action in which the pleadings state facts relevant to protecting public
health or safety, from entering an order restricting the disclosure of
information obtained through discovery, approving a settlement
agreement that would restrict such disclosure, or restricting access to
court records, subject to exceptions, unless the court has first made
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protective orders unless a “specific and substantial interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of the records” outweighed the
public interest in disclosure of “potential health or safety
hazards.”76
Though primarily focused on giving the public access, SILA
2014 would also have implications for litigants seeking to share
information between related cases. If the public has access to
discovery materials so, presumably, would litigants in other
similar cases as members of the public. And the Act’s nexus to
public health and safety would often preclude protective orders in
the very class of cases that benefit most from discovery sharing—
products liability and tort actions involving products and injuries
of national proportions.77 As Congress considers SILA 2014, it
should consider the negative impact on court efficiency stemming
from protective orders along with the impact on public safety.
Additionally, some state legislatures have considered and
passed transparency and sunshine legislation, including at least
one statute that specifically addresses discovery sharing.78 Still,
the momentum for sunshine legislation in many states tapered
off in the mid-1990s.79
With the constitutional front in the fight against protective
orders largely dormant, the rule-based front effectively dead, and
independent findings of fact that: (1) the order would not restrict the
disclosure of information relevant to the protection of public health or
safety or (2) the public interest in the disclosure of past, present, or
potential health or safety hazards is outweighed by a specific and
substantial interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the
information and the requested protective order is no broader than
necessary to protect the confidentiality interest asserted.
76. Id.
77. See id. (prohibiting protective orders in cases “in which the pleadings
state facts that are relevant to the protection of public health or safety”).
78. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a (mandating a strict balancing test before courts
may enter protective orders restricting access to unfiled discovery that
implicates public health and safety); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 2014)
(forbidding court orders restricting disclosure of information concerning public
hazards); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01 (2014) (forbidding protective orders that
stifle discovery sharing).
79. But see MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-6-112 (2014) (forbidding, by statute
passed in 2005, certain court orders that have “the purpose or effect of
concealing a public hazard”).
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the legislative front pending, the discovery-sharing discussion
often takes place in the context of trial court discretion.80 The
next subpart focuses on the relationship between protective-order
discretion and discovery sharing.
C. Sharing Discovery in Similar Cases
Litigants often seek to use discovery information obtained in
one case to prepare and develop another related case.81 The
concept known as “discovery sharing” flows from a basic,
uncontested proposition: Litigants may freely distribute discovery
information unless a valid court order forbids them from doing
so.82 And even if a court order limits how parties use discovery
information, judges have broad discretion to refuse dissemination
80. See, e.g., Ashley A. Kutz, Note, Rethinking The “Good Cause”
Requirement: A New Federal Approach to Granting Protective Orders Under
F.R.C.P. 26(c), 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 291, 293 (2007) (describing approaches to
determining good cause that range from “rubber-stamping” proposed protective
orders to “hostility toward confidentiality,” analyzing various circuits’
approaches to “good cause,” and proposing an improved protective-order process
under 26(c)).
81. See, e.g., Idar v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. C-10-217, 2011 WL
688871, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2011) (denying a protective order modification
while acknowledging that the order allows for “sharing of discovered
information with attorneys and other necessary persons representing parties
with present or future cases pending against Defendant that arise out of the
same or similar set of facts, transactions, or occurrences”); Wal-Mart Stores E.,
L.P. v. Endicott, 81 So. 3d 486, 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (noting
respondents’ request for a sharing provision to include collateral litigants);
Pincheira v. Allstate Ins. Co., 190 P.3d 322, 337 (N.M. 2008) (“The parties and
amici recognize that this case is really about discovery sharing, both with other
litigants and with the public at large.”); Cowan v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 061330-MLB, 2007 WL 1796198, at *5 (D. Kan. June 19, 2007) (“The Court
recognizes the public policy benefit of potentially sharing documents with
attorneys involved in litigation of a similar product with similar issues.”).
82. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984)
(holding that where “a protective order is entered on a showing of good cause as
required by Rule 26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and
does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other
sources, it does not offend the First Amendment”); see also Moskowitz, supra
note 67, at 825 (“Absent a protective order, a plaintiff or defendant has the right
to disseminate information obtained during discovery so long as the purpose for
sharing is lawful.”).
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to one group (e.g., the media) and allow dissemination to another
(e.g., litigants in similar, but separate, litigation).83
Plaintiffs’ attorneys typically contend that sharing
information between similar cases allows them to avoid
wastefully reinventing the wheel by repeatedly conducting
virtually identical discovery.84 Beyond these efficiency gains,
sharing proponents contend that exchanging information allows
isolated plaintiffs to prepare cases collaboratively, leveling the
playing field with large law firms and national collaboration on
the other side of the docket. Sharing also increases discovery
accountability by allowing parties to compare discovery responses
against responses in a similar case.85
Despite the apparent benefits, disputes about the propriety of
sharing have persisted for decades.86 Indeed, in the early 1990s,
one leading pro-confidentiality commentator had already noted
that the debate over so-called discovery sharing was
“retrograde.”87 Some courts’ continued reticence to allow it is
curious, particularly considering the overwhelming consensus
83. See, e.g., Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Super. Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr.
2d 885, 890 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that it is within trial courts’ discretion
to allow sharing with similar litigants while denying access to the general
public).
84. See FRANCIS H. HARE, JR. ET AL., CONFIDENTIALITY ORDERS 69–70 (John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1988) (contending that discovery, as a result of nonsharing
protective orders, “must be repeated anew in every case,” with the trial courts
being forced to intervene in a repetition of the same discovery disputes); Ward v.
Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 580 (D. Colo. 1982) (asserting that denying
sharing between litigants “would be tantamount to holding that each litigant
who wishes to ride a taxi to court must undertake the expense of inventing the
wheel”).
85. See, e.g., FRANCIS H. HARE, JR. ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: COMBATING
STONEWALLING AND OTHER DISCOVERY ABUSES 166 (ATLA Press 1995) (arguing
that “information sharing also provides plaintiffs the opportunity to verify the
completeness and accuracy of a defendant manufacturer’s response to discovery
request”); cf. Marcus, supra note 10, at 495–96 (“In addition, in some cases
access may prevent efforts to mislead the court in the second case.”).
86. Compare Campbell, supra note 2, at 824 (opposing information sharing
on the ground that it creates waste and threatens proprietary interests of
parties), with Marcus, supra note 10, at 495–96 (observing that discovery
sharing benefits the litigation system), and Rhiana Sharp, Comment, Let in a
Little Sunshine: Limiting Confidential Settlements in Missouri, 69 MO. L. REV.
215, 229 (2004) (“Discovery sharing should be encouraged.”).
87. Marcus, supra note 10, at 495.
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among commentators and litigation experts that the practice is
appropriate and does indeed increase court efficiency.88
At one time or another, the Federal Courts Study Committee,
an American Bar Association commission, the Federal Judicial
Center, state legislatures, and the authors of the discovery and
protective order sections of the leading federal practice treatise
have all endorsed some form of shared discovery.89 Even those
who have strenuously opposed widespread public disclosure of
discovery information have conceded that an appropriate
nonparty use of discovery is to prepare for related cases distinct
from the case in which the discovery materials are first
obtained.90
But despite broad support for the concept of discovery
sharing and the regular recurrence of the issue in productsliability and other complex litigation, courts around the country
are in disarray about if, when, and how to allow the practice.91 In
part, this fracture traces subtle disagreements among
commentators on the proper method to share discovery
information among cases.92 First, both commentators and courts
disagree about which procedural mechanism is most appropriate
to enable sharing.93 Courts typically employ one of two sharing
88. See id. at 495 (noting that “courts continue to recognize that access for
other plaintiffs should be allowed whether or not it is necessary to facilitate the
preparation of the case before them because such sharing saves the courts and
the litigants time and money”).
89. See sources cited supra note 10 (citing examples of commentators who
endorse discovery sharing); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.432
(2004) (endorsing sharing).
90. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 10, at 498–99 (“The judge should
consider . . . the benefits of making the material available in other lawsuits and
the economies achieved when lawyers collaborate in preparing their
cases. . . . [T]he adjudicatory system will often be well-served by allowing the
pooling of discovery materials . . . .”).
91. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 5.
92. Compare Marcus, supra note 2, at 41–42 (mandating that collateral
litigants establish entitlement to discovery information before sharing and
thereby establishing intervention and modification as the preferred sharing
mechanism), with David Timmins, Note, Protective Orders in Products Liability
Litigation: Striking the Proper Balance, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503, 1543
(1991) (preferring protective orders with sharing provisions).
93. Compare Long v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc., No. CV-09-2209-PHXDGC, 2010 WL 1740831, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010) (“[T]he court that entered
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mechanisms: sharing provisions included in protective orders
from the outset (“upfront” sharing provisions) or later protectiveorder modifications.
Second, courts and commentators disagree about the latitude
trial courts have to grant or deny requests for sharing in either of
the two common forms. In some jurisdictions, upfront sharing
provisions are mandatory94 absent countervailing factors, while
other courts have discretion to grant or deny sharing requests.95
And in at least one jurisdiction, entering a sharing protective
order can be an abuse of discretion under certain circumstances.96
This subpart illuminates these fault lines by examining the
two common sharing mechanisms in turn.

the protective order must ‘satisfy itself that the protected discovery is
sufficiently relevant to the collateral litigation that a substantial amount of
duplicative discovery will be avoided by modifying the protective order.’”), and
Marcus, supra note 2, at 41 (arguing that nonparty access may be justified
“when litigants seek to obtain evidence relevant to other litigation”), with Garcia
v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Tex. 1987) (deciding that, due to “[t]he public
policies favoring shared information,” the trial court erred in granting a
protective order that prohibited the free exchange of discovered documents), and
Timmins, supra note 92, at 1543 (advocating for sharing provisions in protective
orders).
94. See Garcia, 734 S.W.2d at 346 (indicating that “balanced against
concerns for confidentiality . . . are the public policies favoring the exchange of
information” which “require that any protective order be carefully
tailored . . . while allowing an exchange of discovered documents”).
95. See Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Super. Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d
885, 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“To protect the privilege accorded to trade secrets
in Evidence Code section 1060 . . . a trial court must balance the interests of
both sides . . . a three-step process.”).
96. See Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P. v. Endicott, 81 So. 3d 486, 490 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2011) (“[T]o the extent a sharing provision is used, the provision must
be narrowly tailored in scope and balanced with the need to protect the
confidential nature of the documents sought to be discovered and the
established need of the known collateral litigant to view the discovery.”); Cordis
Corp. v. O’Shea, 988 So. 2d 1163, 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that a
protective order permitting products-liability plaintiffs to release a
manufacturer’s confidential information from discovery to attorneys not
representing the parties or those in a collateral litigation was a departure from
the essential requirements of law).
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1. Upfront Sharing Provisions

Whether to include sharing provisions in protective orders
from the outset comes up frequently in products-liability
litigation. For instance, suppose that a party, WidgetCo, produces
particularly dangerous widgets from 2010–2013. The widget
injures Sally.
In turn, Sally sues WidgetCo on a products-liability theory
and seeks discovery related to widget designs. WidgetCo objects,
contending that the widget designs comprise competitively
sensitive commercial information. The trial judge orders
WidgetCo to produce the designs but simultaneously issues a
protective order to keep the litigants from disclosing WidgetCo’s
proprietary information to the public and, more specifically,
competitors. Before the judge issues the protective order,
however, she has to decide whether to include an upfront
discovery-sharing provision, or not.97
The nonsharing scenario: The protective order forbids
anyone in the case from disclosing discovery information to
anyone other than the parties, their attorneys, their attorneys’
office staff, and experts.98 Failure to abide by the order is
punishable by contempt. The protective order also includes a
“return-and-destroy” provision that requires Sally and her
lawyers to return all discovery information to WidgetCo at the
end of the litigation and destroy any information that is not
returned.99
The sharing scenario: In contrast, imagine that the
protective order forbids disseminating discovery information to
anyone but the parties, attorneys, office staff, experts, and those

97. One form or another of this hypothetical is a frequently repeated fact
pattern in courts around the country. See, e.g., Williams v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No.
1:06-CV-0051-RWS, 2006 WL 1835437 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2006) (illustrating a
fact pattern akin to the aforementioned hypothetical).
98. Cf., e.g., Menendez ex rel. Menendez v. Wal-Mart Stores E. LP, No.
1:10-CV-53, 2012 WL 90140, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 11, 2012) (forbidding sharing
upon finding that the nonsharing protective order was not too restrictive).
99. Cf., e.g., Hamm v. Matlack, Inc., No. 95-20-FR, 1995 WL 405250, at *1
(D. Or. June 21, 1995) (requiring the return of protected documents at the
conclusion of the litigation).
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same categories of people in substantially similar litigation.100
The sharing protective order further defines “substantially
similar litigation” to include pending litigation involving
allegedly defective widgets manufactured between 2010–2013
that allegedly injured a person.
The sharing order also specifically forbids dissemination of
the information to WidgetCo’s competitors, even if they would
otherwise be eligible to share in the information.101 Like the
nonsharing order, anyone who violates the sharing order is
subject to contempt. Moreover, the order requires any person
receiving WidgetCo’s discovery information to agree to be bound
by the order’s terms, including its contempt provision.102
Various courts routinely issue both types of protective
orders.103 The practical implications of the courts’ choice are
significant to both litigants and the broader system. The
nonsharing order allows the litigants to use discovery information
to prepare only the case at hand. This approach is consistent with
the primary purpose of discovery—to prepare the case at hand for
trial.
But it is simultaneously inconsistent, at least in part, with
Rule 1’s command that the Civil Rules be “construed and
administered” to secure the “speedy [] and inexpensive

100. Cf., e.g., Raymond Handling Concepts, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 888
(balancing the public interest in information sharing among litigants in similar
cases and litigant confidentiality interests while upholding a sharing order).
101. Cf., e.g., Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Tex. 1987) (holding
that courts can require those wishing to share discovery material to certify that
they will not release it to competitors).
102. Cf., e.g., id. at 346
Nothing herein shall prevent the exhibition of the documents and
other materials covered by this protective order to experts who are
assisting counsel in the preparation of this matter for trial, if such
counsel has first obtained the written agreement of such persons to be
bound by the terms of this Order.
103. Compare Idar v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., No. C-10-217, 2011 WL
688871 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2011) (sharing order), and Cowan v. Gen. Motors
Corp., No. 06-1330-MLB, 2007 WL 1796198 (D. Kan. June 19, 2007) (sharing
order), with Williams v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-0051-RWS, 2006 WL
1835437, at *1–2 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2006) (nonsharing order), and Jochims v.
Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 145 F.R.D. 499, 502–03 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (nonsharing order).
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determination of every action and proceeding.”104 While the
nonsharing order may allow parties in the primary case to
prepare for trial, it simultaneously stops other litigants from
efficiently preparing other similar cases.105
Likewise, imagine an attorney with two separate, but
similar, cases in two courts. Further imagine a strict nonsharing
protective order in one case that specifically provided that
discovery should only be used “for purposes of this litigation.” The
order would force the attorney to repeat the same discovery in the
other case even though the attorney would already have the
discovery materials sitting in her office.
The sharing protective order, on the other hand, allows Sally
to disseminate the information not only within the Sally v.
WidgetCo case but also to other related litigation—obviating the
need for repetitive discovery.106 And it does so without
undermining the WidgetCo interests that the court sought to
protect. The value of WidgetCo’s information stems from the fact
that WidgetCo’s competitors do not have access to it, and the
protective order specifically forbids Sally, or anyone else receiving
the discovery information, from providing it to a competitor.107
Of course, protective orders can be violated and, as a matter
of simple probability, each additional person who receives the
information under the sharing order makes it marginally more
likely that the information makes its way to a competitor.108 But
decades of experience with sharing protective orders shows that
104. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added).
105. See, e.g., Kamp Implement Co., Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 630 F. Supp. 218,
220 (D. Mont. 1986) (stating that a nonsharing order “would result in
duplication of time and effort [by the court] in each instance where discovery is
sought”).
106. See, e.g., Garcia, 734 S.W.2d at 346–47 (recognizing that allowing
information exchanges between similarly situated litigants would enhance full
disclosure and efficiency in the trial system).
107. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984)
(noting, in the takings context, that the value of trade secret potentially is
diminished only in circumstances where the government orders disclosure of
“trade secret to others who are under no obligation to protect the confidentiality
of the information”).
108. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 2, at 824 (positing that the likelihood of
protective-order violations increases with each disclosure of discovery
information).
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violations are relatively rare and violations involving a leak to a
competitor are virtually nonexistent.109 And nonsharing orders,
like sharing orders, can be violated. Considering the size of some
in-house litigation staffs and the large numbers of outside
counsel who staff complex lawsuits, it is feasible that a even
nonsharing order could provide access to dozens, if not hundreds,
of people. Thus, arguments about increased potential harm from
sharing orders ignore those same risks in nonsharing orders.
The sharing protective order also seems to create efficiencies
for WidgetCo—the order would seem to reduce WidgetCo’s own
discovery expenses in future cases.110 This benefit is particularly
important in repeating-case contexts, like products liability.
Mass-produced products that face defect allegations tend to
injure more than one person.111 In theory, the basic factual
premise—that the product is defective and causes injury—is the
same in each case, so discovery from one to another substantially
overlaps.112 Thus, under the sharing order, WidgetCo could
simply provide discovery from the primary case to subsequent
cases to expedite the process.
At least one antisharing commentator has contended sharing
provisions in protective orders will encourage defendants not to
cooperate in discovery, increasing systemic costs.113 This
argument (like many on the prosharing side) has neither been
109. But see, e.g., McDonald v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 186 F. App’x 930,
932 (11th Cir. 2006) (upholding sanctions imposed for providing protected
discovery materials to unauthorized persons involved in collateral litigation).
110. See Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 775 N.W.2d 302, 309–10 (Iowa 2009)
(marveling at Microsoft’s expenditures to respond to a single discovery order—
over $5.5 million—and viewing any ruling that required repetition of that feat
with incredulity).
111. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., 198 F.R.D. 654, 655 (S.D.
Ind. 2001) (“The [Firestone] tires have been linked to the deaths of 148
Americans, and 6.5 million tires were recalled on August 9, 2000.”).
112. Of course, in practice, litigants often dispute whether the defect that
injured one plaintiff is the same as the defect that injured another. But in a
significant number of cases (e.g., the same allegedly faulty airbag sensor in a
particular make, model, and year of car) the issues and discovery largely
overlap.
113. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 824 (“Defendants faced with the
prospect that documents produced in one case will generate similar claims
throughout the country will more aggressively resist disclosure.”).
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confirmed nor refuted by empirical evidence, leaving courts to
grapple with the potential benefits and costs of sharing.
With experience and common sense, at least, supporting the
notion that avoiding repetitive discovery saves resources, why
would a defendant, like WidgetCo, ever insist on a nonsharing
order? In many cases, the putative reason for requesting a
nonsharing order—to protect competitive information—may be
pretextual. Perhaps one reason a defendant, like WidgetCo,
would seek a nonsharing order might be to gain a long-term
advantage in repeating litigation.114
By limiting the information to the case at hand, nonsharing
orders increase the time and expense of bringing claims against
the defendant.115 And the orders also isolate litigants in similar
cases from one another, stifling collaboration among, and
decreasing the efficacy of, plaintiffs’ counsel.116
Using the WidgetCo hypothetical, imagine that the widget
injures another plaintiff, John. John files suit against WidgetCo.
With a nonsharing order in place in Sally’s case, Sally’s lawyers
cannot reveal to John’s lawyers what they learned about the
widget or WidgetCo’s conduct through discovery. John’s lawyers
do not have the benefit of WidgetCo’s previous responses and
must invest time and resources to conduct the discovery treasure
hunt all over again.
Meanwhile, WidgetCo’s attorneys would presumably have
the benefit of a national network of outside counsel to weigh a
coordinated response.117 Those lawyers, unlike John’s, would have
the benefit of collective knowledge of the impact of particular
discovery information on later discovery disputes, merits rulings,
and settlement negotiations.
114. Antisharing commentators have admitted as much. See Campbell,
supra note 2, at 824.
115. See, e.g., Comes, 775 N.W.2d at 311 (describing “staggering” costs of
repeating discovery in a second case involving similar issues).
116. See Patterson v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F.R.D. 152, 153–54 (W.D. Tex.
1980) (reasoning that collaboration between plaintiffs’ counsel furthers Rule 1
interests); Marcus, supra note 10, at 495 (noting the common plaintiffs’
complaint about protective orders stifling collaboration).
117. See HARE, JR. ET AL., supra note 84, at 21 (“Corporate defendants have
achieved efficiency by using economies of scale, regional or national
coordination, and cost spreading among related cases.”).
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Forcing each plaintiff to conduct discovery from this isolated
position has two immediate benefits for WidgetCo. First, it raises
the cost and effort required to bring suits against WidgetCo.118
Requiring each plaintiff to expend resources litigating discovery
disputes anew makes cases less economically desirable.
Theoretically, this barrier to entry reduces the number of
lawsuits against the company.
Second, not all plaintiffs’ counsel are created equal, and some
are undoubtedly more proficient at conducting discovery than
others. By requiring each plaintiff’s attorney to stand on her own,
WidgetCo gains a net advantage against weaker litigators when
compared with a system that allowed those same lawyers to
collaborate with more-skilled lawyers. Moreover, allowing parties
to compare current discovery responses with previously produced
material may allow detection of discovery misconduct, like
perjury in a deposition or omitted documents in response to a
request for production.
Faced with these competing concerns, courts have considered
whether efficiency and plaintiffs’ interest in collaboration
outweigh defendants’ interest in protecting competitively
sensitive information and the potential systemic costs of allegedly
disruptive sharing provisions.119
At one end of the spectrum, an early and seminal discoverysharing case found a court abused its discretion by denying a
request for a discovery-sharing provision.120 Noting that truth
seeking in litigation is often hampered by the “adversarial
approach to discovery,” the court held that “shared discovery is
an effective means to insure full and fair disclosure.”121 It went on
118. See, e.g., Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 775 N.W.2d 302, 310–11 (Iowa 2009)
(“When we add to the mix the time, money, and effort expended by counsel and
support staff for the Iowa plaintiffs in organizing and analyzing the information
after Microsoft produced it, the staggering cost of repeating the process in the
Canadian litigation comes even more sharply into focus.”).
119. See Wolhar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 712 A.2d 464, 469 (Del. Super. Ct.
1997) (weighing proprietary interests against the interest in efficient litigation).
120. See Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Tex. 1987) (finding that the
trial court abused its discretion by denying discovery sharing).
121. Id. at 347. Garcia was decided under a state rule of civil procedure that
differed somewhat from Rule 26(c), but the court implied that the opinion’s
reasoning was also applicable to a revised rule that more closely mirrored Fed.
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to note that the efficiency sharing generates was among the
“public policies” favoring upfront sharing orders.122
Other courts have endorsed sharing but have given trial
courts discretion to include upfront sharing provisions or not. For
example, in Raymond Handling Concepts Corporation v. Superior
Court,123 a California court refused to disturb a trial court’s
protective order, finding that the court had properly exercised its
discretion to allow discovery sharing.124
Still other courts, particularly in the federal system, have
been hostile to upfront sharing provisions. For instance, in Long
v. TRW Vehicle Safety Systems, Inc.,125 both parties agreed that
some type of protective order was appropriate but disputed the
propriety of a sharing provision in the protective order.126
Rejecting the provision, the court insisted that the proper
procedure to share discovery required collateral litigants to
intervene after the fact and seek to modify the nonsharing
protective order.127 According to the court, “a collateral
litigant . . . should not be granted automatic access to a
defendant’s confidential documents.”128
In recent years, the sharing–nonsharing protective-order rift
has deepened. Florida appellate courts have twice reversed
sharing protective orders as an abuse of trial-court discretion.129
R. Civ. P. 26(c). See id. at 345 n.1 (reasoning that Texas’s recent amendments
would change the state rule of civil procedure to more closely resemble the
federal rule).
122. See id. at 346–47 (stating that the public policies supporting sharing
“require that any protective order be carefully tailored to protect [the
defendant’s] proprietary interests while allowing an exchange of discovered
documents”).
123. 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 885 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
124. See id. at 888.
125. No. CV-09-2209-PHX-DGC, 2010 WL 1740831 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010).
126. See id. at *1 (describing disagreement between parties regarding
whether a protective order should contain a sharing provision).
127. See id. (noting that a nonsharing protective order does not preclude
sharing of discovery forever).
128. Id.
129. See Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P. v. Endicott, 81 So. 3d 486, 490 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2011) (denying request for sharing order when proposed sharing
provision conflicted with Florida trade-secret statute); Cordis Corp. v. O’Shea,
988 So. 2d 1163, 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (denying sharing order in favor
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In contrast to California and Texas, one Florida court forbade
upfront sharing when the provisions potentially interfered with
other courts’ discovery rulings or state trade-secret law.130
According to the court, discovery sharing could be better
accomplished through later case-by-case protective-order
modifications.131
Thus, there is currently a three-way split among jurisdictions
on when and how to allow discovery sharing. While some courts
favor later protective-order modifications to upfront sharing
provisions, the modification landscape is itself fractured in a way
that threatens the viability of sharing in some cases.
2. Modification
Courts have long been in split on the proper standard for
modifying protective orders to allow discovery sharing.132
Building on the WidgetCo hypothetical above: Imagine
that the court in the WidgetCo v. Sally products-liability case (the
original case) enters a nonsharing protective order to protect
WidgetCo’s confidential information. The order restricts discovery
access to the WidgetCo v. Sally parties, their attorneys, legal
staff, and experts in the case. Later, John, a litigant in a similar
case in another court, asks the WidgetCo v. Sally court to allow
him and his attorneys access to the WidgetCo v. Sally discovery
information for use in John’s lawsuit. May the court modify the

of later modification when protective order did not identify collateral litigants).
130. See Wal-Mart, 81 So. 3d at 490 (refusing to uphold a sharing order
when it might violate Florida trade-secret law); Cordis Corp., 988 So. 2d at 1167
(fearing that the sharing order might contradict other courts’ discovery rulings).
131. See Wal-Mart, 81 So. 3d at 489 (favoring a protective-order modification
over granting a sharing order); Cordis Corp., 988 So. 2d at 1167 (preferring a
case-by-case determination to modify protective orders instead of granting
sharing orders).
132. Compare Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir.
1979) (requiring “extraordinary circumstance or compelling need” to modify
protective order), with Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1301 (7th Cir.
1980) (concluding that collateral litigants in similar cases are “presumptively
entitled to access” protected discovery), superseded by rule as stated in Bond v.
Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 2009).
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protective order to permit John access and under what terms? It
turns out that the answer varies across jurisdictions.
Most courts agree on the basic framework for protectiveorder modification. For starters, courts retain the power to
modify their own protective orders, even after the litigation
ends.133 Similar to the broad discretion courts have to fashion
protective orders in the first place, courts have substantial
latitude to make changes to existing orders.
Both parties and nonparties to the order may move to
modify.134 And in the federal system, most courts agree that
nonparties must seek permission to intervene pursuant to Rule
24(b) before, or at the same time, they request to modify the
order.135
But permission to intervene establishes only that the third
party gets to ask the court to modify the protective order;
permission to intervene does not answer the more important
question of whether the order should actually be modified.136
Thus, disputes generally turn on the standard to modify, not the
standard to intervene under Rule 24(b).137
133. See, e.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424,
1427 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding that the district court had power to modify
protective order in closed case). But see Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1079
(7th Cir. 2009) (foreclosing the possibility that the district court had inherent
authority to revisit and rescind the protective order).
134. See, e.g., 8A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2044.1 (“[O]rdinarily
requests to modify are directed to the district court’s discretion and subject to
review only for abuse of discretion.”).
135. See, e.g., EEOC v. Nat’l Children’s Ctr., Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1045 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (emphasizing that parties must abide by Rule 24(b) when attempting
to modify an order).
136. See, e.g., In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab.
Litig., 245 F.R.D. 632, 635 (D. Minn. 2007) (granting motion to intervene and
then proceeding to questions related to confidentiality orders); United Nuclear
Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding the
district court’s decision to allow intervention to challenge a protective order
before clarifying other issues); see also, e.g., 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 26.106 (3d ed. 1997) (“The correct procedure for a nonparty
to challenge a protective order is a motion to intervene in the action in which
the protective order was issued.”); 8A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2044.1
(stating that “granting intervention does not imply that the protect order will be
modified, but provides only that the intervenor may be heard on that subject”).
137. See 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 136, ¶ 26.106 (outlining the standards
and factors courts use to decide whether to modify an order).
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The standards to modify protective orders are in apparent
disarray, and even vary within the same jurisdiction, depending
on the party who is seeking to modify and the circumstances
under which the order was entered.138 Courts modify stipulated
umbrella orders more liberally than other protective orders
because no particularized good cause showing is made when an
umbrella order is entered.139 Likewise, collateral litigants who
seek to modify protective orders to gain access to discovery
materials for use in their own cases often face a less onerous
standard than third-party media or public interest litigants who
seek access to disseminate discovery materials to the broader
public.140
In addition, a circuit split persists even on the standard to
allow access for collateral litigants.141 The division among
modifying courts stems from the competing Rule 1 concerns
conjured by discovery sharing.142
On one hand, protective orders supposedly grease the wheels
of litigation by ensuring secrecy—so long as parties can rely on
protective orders being enforced over the long term.143
138. See id. (discussing the multitude of standards that courts apply,
depending on the situation, to determine whether to modify a protective order).
139. See San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096,
1103 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Such blanket orders are inherently subject to challenge
and modification, as the party resisting disclosure generally has not made a
particularized showing of good cause with respect to any individual document.”).
140. Cf., e.g., 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 136, ¶ 26.106 (generalizing that
most courts favor avoiding duplicative discovery and allow a collateral litigant
to access discovery protected by a protective order).
141. See 8A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16, § 2044.1 (comparing the Second
Circuit’s “very restrictive attitude” regarding a modification with the Seventh
Circuit’s functional approach to allowing access).
142. See, e.g., Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980)
(observing that Rule 1 efficiency concerns weigh in favor of modification for use
of discovery in collateral litigation), superseded by rule as stated in Bond v.
Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 2009); cf. Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 775 N.W.2d
302, 311 (Iowa 2009) (weighing a party’s legitimate interest in confidentiality
against systemic benefits of protective-order modification); see also, 8A WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 16, § 2044.1 (noting that courts confronted with protective
orders have choices between concerns grounded in Rule 1).
143. See SEC v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 230 (2d Cir. 2001 (“If
protective orders were easily modified, moreover, parties would be less
forthcoming in giving testimony and less willing to settle their disputes.”); cf.
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On the other hand, refusing to modify nonsharing protective
orders prevents similarly situated litigants from sharing already
produced discovery, forcing each new case to engage in
unnecessary re-discovery of the same information.144 The current
circuit split reflects this tension.
Valuing party reliance over the benefits of sharing, the
Second Circuit often requires “extraordinary circumstances” to
modify existing protective orders.145 In Martindell v.
International Telephone,146 the district court denied a government
request to modify a protective order, a request that would have
given the government access to depositions from a civil case for
use in a related criminal prosecution.147 The Second Circuit
affirmed, holding that courts should modify protective orders only
on “a showing of improvidence in the grant of a Rule 26(c)
protective order or some extraordinary circumstance or
compelling need.”148
To be sure, Martindell’s holding should be construed more
narrowly than it often is.149 The actual discovery information at
issue comprised depositions of witnesses who relied on the

Marcus, supra note 10, at 485 (noting that lack of protective order creating
“general public access would tend to disrupt the cooperative exchange of
discovery”).
144. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th
Cir. 2003) (“Allowing the fruits of one litigation to facilitate preparation in other
cases advances the interests of judicial economy by avoiding the wasteful
duplication of discovery.”).
145. See Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir.
1979) (requiring “extraordinary circumstance or compelling need” to modify
protective order); see also, e.g., In re Sept. 11 Litig., 262 F.R.D. 274, 277
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[P]laintiff seeking to modify a protective order [must] show
improvidence in the grant of a Rule 26(c) protective order or some extraordinary
circumstance or compelling need.” (internal quotations omitted)).
146. 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979).
147. See id. at 293 (denying the government’s modification request because
deposition testimony had been given in reliance on the protective order).
148. Id. at 296 (emphasis added).
149. See, e.g., SEC v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 299 n.7 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“Though Martindell did involve a Government request to modify a protective
order, its logic is not restricted to Government requests, nor did our opinion in
Martindell suggest otherwise.”).
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protective order to not invoke their Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination.150
An easy modification would have discouraged similarly
situated witnesses from cooperating in discovery in the future—
creating just the type of inefficiency Rule 1 will not brook. So the
circuit court put its thumb on the side of protecting reliance
interests, declining to find “extraordinary circumstances” and
refusing to modify the order.
Most circuits have taken a more liberal approach to
modifying protective orders. In an oft-cited case, Wilk v. American
Medical Ass’n,151 the Seventh Circuit declined to follow the
extraordinary circumstances test.152 Instead, the case announced
a presumption in favor of modifications to allow discovery
sharing.153 But when parties opposed to discovery sharing can
demonstrate prejudice flowing from the modification, according to
Wilk, courts should employ a balancing test to weigh the benefits
of discovery sharing against that prejudice.154
This approach reasonably addresses the Rule 1 tensions
described. Parties’ actual reliance interests are considered and
protected to ensure that protective orders maintain the teeth
necessary to encourage full cooperation in discovery. At the same
time, the test operates under a presumption in favor of the wellknown benefits of discovery sharing.155

150. See Martindell, 594 F.2d at 293 (denying the government’s modification
request because deposition testimony had been given in reliance on the
protective order, rendering the reliance on the Fifth Amendment unnecessary by
the witnesses).
151. 635 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1980), superseded by rule as stated in Bond v.
Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 2009).
152. See id. at 1299–1300 (forgoing the extraordinary circumstance standard
in favor of the presumption that pretrial discovery must take place in public).
153. See id. (holding that when a modification of a protective order can place
private litigants in a position they would otherwise reach only after repetitious
discovery, courts should only deny the modification when it would prejudice
substantial rights of the party opposing modification).
154. See id. at 1299 (instructing courts to determine whether the injury to
the party opposing the modification outweighs the benefits of the modification).
155. See id. at 1299–1300 (describing the economic and efficiency benefits of
discovery sharing).
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III. Trends in Discovery Reform

The court-confidentiality problem did not arise in a vacuum.
Instead, the focus on confidentiality stems from a pretrialdiscovery regime that some contend is uniquely intrusive and
costly.156 But the discovery status quo is soon to be affected by
proposed rule amendments that are likely to become law.157
These amendments have the potential to weaken the core
rationale justifying easily obtainable confidentiality orders by
making discovery less intrusive in certain cases. And the
amendments’ focus on proportionality will work in tandem with
discovery sharing to reduce discovery burdens on courts and
litigants.
Before examining the current proposed changes, it would be
helpful to understand some basic milestones in the development
of the pretrial discovery system and how they relate to the
development of protective-order law.
A. History
By all accounts, the late-1930s adoption of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure transformed litigation.158 The new rules
introduced myriad pretrial discovery mechanisms to a system
that traditionally relied on trial-by-surprise.159 Indeed, before the
156. See John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective
Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 549 (2010) (explaining why pretrial
discovery has become “one of the most divisive and nettlesome issues in civil
litigation”).
157. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, REPORT TO THE STANDING
COMMITTEE, app. B-31, 10–26 (June 14, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2014-add.pdf (outlining the proposed
changes to Rule 26 and including the Committee’s notes explaining those
changes).
158. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 16, at 12–13 (observing that the civil rules
transformed American litigation and laid the groundwork for a period of
American procedural “exceptionalism”).
159. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)
(noting that the discovery rules make trial “less a game of blind man’s buff and
more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest
practice”); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (“[C]ivil trials in the
federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear,
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civil rules, parties had almost no opportunity for pretrial
discovery, with a few limited exceptions.160
The hope behind these changes was that pretrial discovery
would enhance the quality of fact-finding and increase efficiency
at trial.161 Because the new rules allowed the parties to unearth a
wide range of information in advance, trial would be narrowed to
only those facts and issues truly in dispute.162 Likewise, trial
would hopefully be less of a game of concealment and surprise (as
it had traditionally been) and more of a search for the truth.163
The introduction of pretrial discovery also complemented the
civil rules’ notice pleading standards. Before the rules, pleading
was onerous—parties were required to state claims and defenses
in exacting factual detail.164 The new pleading rules reduced this
burden, requiring only that parties plead in a general form giving
the opposing side notice of claims and defenses.165 In the new
notice pleading system, parties could no longer rely on the
complaint or the answer to learn the factual basis of the other
side’s claim. Rather, parties would get notice of the claims via the
pleadings and rely on discovery to uncover the facts.166
consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial [through discovery].”).
160. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501 (noting the “cumbersome” and “narrowly
confined” pre-rules discovery processes); see also 8 WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001 (3d ed. 2010) (describing the means by which
parties conducted pretrial discovery prior to the rules as “very limited”).
161. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical
Background of the 1938 Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 725–26 (1998)
(emphasizing that the changes to pretrial discovery would improve efficiency at
trial and prevent surprises).
162. See, e.g., Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501 (proclaiming that the new rules
enabled parties to “clarify the basic issues between [them]” before trial).
163. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. at 682 (noting that trial would
become “more of a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the
fullest practicable extent”).
164. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 500 (noting that before the civil rules, “the
pre-trial functions of notice-giving issue-formulation and fact-revelation were
performed primarily and inadequately by the pleadings”).
165. See id. at 501 (interpreting the new rules to require the pleadings only
to give notice to the opposing side).
166. See id. (stating that the “deposition-discovery process” now has “a vital
role in the preparation for trial”). In recent years, the Supreme Court has
revisited this notice pleading standard, requiring some degree of factual

2216

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181 (2014)

The breadth of information parties could seek in discovery
grew for decades.167 Indeed, under the new regime parties were
entitled to all relevant, nonprivileged information in the
possession of any person.168 This reversed a long-standing court
aversion to pretrial “fishing expeditions.”169
This procedural expansion accompanied a substantive
expansion, and some would say “litigation boom,” in American
courts.170 The advent of products liability litigation, the
concurrent expansion of tort liability, and the explosion of civil
rights litigation transformed the substantive legal landscape
during the 1950s and 1960s.171
In 1970, amendments to the civil rules set the high water
mark for broad discovery.172 But during the ensuing decade, the
tide in favor of liberal discovery procedure began to change.173 By
the late 1970s, commentators and courts began rumbling for
specificity in pleading. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (noting
that the pleading standard in Rule 8 does not require detailed factual
allegations but requires more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(reemphasizing that Rule 8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain statement that
gives the defendant fair notice); see also Dustin B. Benham, Twombly and Iqbal
Should (Finally!) Put the Distinction Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud Out
of Its Misery, 64 SMU L. REV. 649, 678 (2011) (interpreting Iqbal and Twombly
to require a party to plead specific factual allegations as to make a claim for
relief plausible).
167. See 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 2011 (noting the shift in
perspective by the Supreme Court, deciding that discovery fishing expeditions
are acceptable).
168. See id. (stating that “a party is not required to have the affirmative of
the issue upon which he seeks discovery”).
169. See Subrin, supra note 161, at 743–45 (chronicling the Advisory
Committee debates during the creation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and observing that the rule drafters largely chose not to include restraints
against fishing expeditions).
170. See Marcus, supra note 16, at 13 (referring to the mid-century
transformation of American litigation as a product of both the procedural and
substantive developments in American law).
171. See id. (listing the various growths in certain areas of law that
contributed to the shifting legal landscape).
172. See id. (noting that the amendments to the rules benefited plaintiffs by
making it easier to obtain proof and increase damages awards).
173. See id. at 14 (referencing the shift in the attitude regarding discovery
as “a recoil”).
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change.174 At around the same time, the relationship between the
breadth of discovery materials and the proper use of discovery
materials (i.e., discovery confidentiality) became a battleground
in the war against what many viewed as an out-of-control
litigation system.175
It comes as no surprise that following the explosion of
pretrial discovery and the substantive bases of recovery during
the 50s and 60s, questions about the use of litigation information
hit the forefront.176 Parties increasingly sought to avoid
responding to discovery altogether through a wave of suspect
boilerplate objections.177 At the same time, parties resisting
discovery sought to limit dissemination of an increasingly broad
swath of litigation information protective orders.178 In response,
other parties chafed under what they viewed as undue

174. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741
(1975) (describing the discovery procedures as “liberal,” “extensive,” “a social
cost rather than a benefit,” and “a threat”).
175. See 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 2001 (reiterating the courts’
growing concern over the “abuse of discovery” by plaintiffs).
176. See, e.g., James P. Moon, In re San Juan Star: Discovery and the First
Amendment, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 229, 232–33 (1982) (discussing the balancing act
between a plaintiff’s First Amendment right to free speech and a defendant’s
right to a fair trial); Susan M. Angele, Rule 26(c) Protective Orders and the First
Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1645, 1654 (1980) (evaluating the competing
interests in suppression and dissemination of discovered information during
litigation); Michael Dore, Confidentiality Orders—The Proper Role of the Courts
in Providing Confidential Treatment for Information Disclosed Through the Pretrial Discovery Process, 14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 3 (1978) (acknowledging that
“courts recognized the inherent danger that material disclosed during the course
of litigation might be used for adverse collateral purposes”); see also Marcus,
supra note 2, at 4 n.25 (recognizing the constitutional limitations on the power
of courts to enter protective orders).
177. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 6 (stating that “the intrusiveness and
burdensome nature of discovery is the most cited objection to the litigation
boom”).
178. According to some pro-transparency advocates of the time, the
confidentiality problem approached epidemic proportions. See HARE, JR. ET AL.,
supra note 84, at 1–6 (describing the “hidden agenda” of a motion for a
protective order, which includes isolating the plaintiff’s attorney from
consultation with other lawyers handling similar cases); cf. HARE, JR. ET AL.,
supra note 85, at 157–62 (indicating that protective orders frequently prevent
plaintiffs from collaborating and result in stonewalling).
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restrictions and aggressively litigated to obtain discovery and
disseminate it widely.179
According to some commentators reflecting on that time, the
American litigation system of the time had become uniquely
“threatening” among the world’s systems.180 But by the early
1980s, the tide turned against broad discovery, if not against
stonewalling by parties to avoid producing responsive
information. Reform has been incremental, many would contend
too slow.181 In 1980, amendments to the discovery rules were
adopted, and three Justices dissented on the ground that the
amendments did not go far enough to curb out-of-control
discovery.182
Another package of discovery-reform amendments was
adopted in 1983.183 These amendments deleted a sentence in Rule
26 that seemed to permit unlimited discovery.184 The changes also
gave judges more tools to combat perceived excesses in discovery,
including a provision that specifically allowed judges to consider
whether discovery was proportional to the case.185
Simultaneously, the confidentiality fight raged on—Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart186 was argued and decided in the spring of
179. See Dore, supra note 176, at 3 (describing the manner in which litigants
can, with very limited restraints, demand information during discovery).
180. See Marcus, supra note 16, at 13 (quoting a federal judge in saying, “[a]
foreigner watching the discovery proceedings in a civil suit would never suspect
that this country has a highly-prized tradition of privacy”).
181. See id. at 17 (“[I]t’s hard to deny that many argue that U.S. procedure
is not functioning as one would want it to function.”).
182. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D.
521, 521 (1980) (“[T]he changes embodied in the amendments fall short of those
needed to accomplish reforms in civil litigation that are long overdue.”).
183. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D.
165, 171–72 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Amendments] (updating Rule 26 to reflect
changes in the general provisions governing discovery).
184. Former Rule 26(a) read, “Unless the court orders otherwise under
subdivision (c) of this rule, the frequency of use of these methods is not limited.”
Id.; see also 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 2008.1 (outlining the changes
made to Rule 26).
185. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (permitting the court to sua sponte
limit discovery after conducting a cost–benefit analysis); 1983 Amendments,
supra note 183, at 172 (discussing the scope of discovery).
186. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).

PROPORTIONALITY, PRETRIAL CONFIDENTIALITY

2219

1984. Thus the Court tightened the discovery rules187 and
affirmed the role of pretrial-discovery confidentiality in less than
one year.188 According to the Seattle Times Court, discovery was
still very broad and litigants still needed protection from broad
dissemination of discovery materials, notwithstanding the
amendments.189
The Court turned out to be prescient—within a few decades
of the first discovery-reform amendments, many commentators
concluded that the changes, particularly the proportionality
amendment, had not been effective in substantially narrowing
discovery.190 And despite continued efforts at reform through the
1990s and early 2000s, at least some still contend that the costs
of discovery, in terms of both privacy and money, are out of
proportion with the benefits.191
B. Current Proposal
In May 2010, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
convened a two-day conference at Duke Law School to discuss
potential solutions to various civil procedure problems.192
Academics, judges, and attorneys from around the country
gathered to exchange ideas, some of which were quite
contentious.193 Interestingly, protective orders were effectively a
187. See 1983 Amendments, supra note 183, at 172 (limiting the scope of
discovery).
188. See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 33 (noting that pretrial discovery should
not be a “public component” of a civil trial).
189. See id. at 36 (“The unique character of the discovery process requires
that the trial court have substantial latitude to fashion protective orders.”); see
also 1983 Amendments, supra note 183, at 172 (“Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved. . . .”).
190. See Jordan M. Singer, Proportionality’s Cultural Foundation, 52 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 145, 148 (2012) (noting that the amendments had “virtually no
impact” on the expansive nature of discovery).
191. See Marcus, supra note 16, at 17 (stating that “the notion that
American litigation is too costly and time-consuming has gained much force”).
192. See id. (describing the conference at Duke Law that dealt with highly
contentious subjects related to the Civil Rules).
193. See id. (detailing the participants that attended the conference and
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non-issue at the conference, meriting only a passing mention
among contributors.194 Instead, the majority of attention focused
on the rules governing pleading and discovery, with an emphasis
on active judicial case management and party cooperation.195
Following the conference, the Advisory Committee spent
three years considering the ideas and ultimately proposed several
amendments to the civil rules in the fall of 2013.196 Echoing
concerns raised at the conference, the proposed amendments
targeted discovery practices.
The original Advisory Committee Proposal would have
amended rules to take some of the teeth out of the sanctions for
failing to preserve evidence; lower the presumptive limits on the
number of interrogatories, depositions, and requests for
admission; require enhanced and accelerated case management;
reaffirm proportionality’s role in the scope of discovery; and
encourage party cooperation through changes to Rule 1.197
After a public comment period during the spring of 2014, the
Advisory Committee withdrew its changes to the presumptive
numerical discovery limits.198 It also substantially revised
what they discussed).
194. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 5 (2010),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Li
brary/Report%20to%20the%20Chief%20Justice.pdf [hereinafter REPORT TO THE
CHIEF JUSTICE] (stating that “protective-order provisions of Rule 26(c) drew no
comment or attention at all, other than suggestions for standardizing protective
orders for categories of litigation”). But see Seymour Moskowitz, What Federal
Lawmakers Can Learn from State Procedural Innovations, 2010 Conference on
Civil Litig. (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
Duke%20Materials/Library/Seymour%20Moskowitz,%20What%20Federal%20R
ulemakers%20Can%20Learn%20From%20State.pdf
(discussing
litigation
secrecy and secrecy reform).
195. See REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 194, at 5 (“Pleading and
discovery dominated Conference suggestions for rule amendments.”).
196. See Marcus, supra note 16, at 17 (describing the process that the
Advisory Committee took to propose amendments to the civil rules).
197. See SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 23 (2013), http://www.uscourts.
gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2013.pdf
(describing
the
purposes of the changes to Rule 1).
198. See Tera E. Brostoff & Jeffrey D. Koelmay, E-Discovery Rules Gets
Late-Night Rewrite, Advisory Committee Approves Rules Package, 82 U.S.L.W.
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proposed language in Rule 37 that would have changed the
threshold to sanction spoliation.199 The comment period also
resulted in tweaks to the language of the remaining proposed rule
changes.200
On May 29, 2014, the Standing Committee on the Rules of
Practice and Procedure approved the Advisory Committee’s
proposal.201 The Judicial Conference voted on the Standing
Committee’s recommendation in the fall, putting the proposal
before the Supreme Court.202 If the Court adopts the Judicial
Conference’s recommendation, the amendments will become law
in December 2015, absent unlikely Congressional action.
All of the amendments in the Duke Package aim to increase
efficiency and reducing unnecessary, wasteful discovery and
discovery litigation.203 But changes to the discovery-scope
provisions, in particular, merit discussion because of their close
relationship to court confidentiality.
The proposed amendments would explicitly limit the scope of
discovery in Rule 26(b)(1) to only that which is proportional to the
case.204 To determine what is “proportional,” courts should
1549 (Apr. 14, 2014) (indicating that public comments contributed to the
Committee’s decision to withdraw its changes to the numerical discovery limits).
199. See id. (describing the unpublished language of Rule 37 as “greatly
simplified”).
200. For instance, the Advisory Committee reordered the proportionality
factors to make “the importance of the issues at stake” first in the list. See
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 68 (describing the rearrangement of the
factors). It also added “parties’ relative access to relevant information” to the list
of factors. Id.; see also Brostoff & Koelmay, supra note 198 (emphasizing the
importance of the comment period on the Advisory Committee’s final proposal).
201. Brostoff, supra note 6.
202. Judicial Conference Receives Budget Update, Forwards Rules Package
to Supreme Court, THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS (Sept. 16, 2014),
http://news.uscourts.gov/judicial-conference-receives-budget-update-forwardsrules-package-supreme-court (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
203. See SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 197, at 18 (“The proposed rules
amendments are aimed at reducing the costs and delays in civil litigation,
increasing realistic access to the courts, and furthering the goals of Rule 1 ‘to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.’”).
204. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 80 (“Parties may obtain
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consider the importance of the issues at stake, the amount in
controversy, the parties’ relative access to sources of proof, the
parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving
the issues, and whether the burden of the discovery outweighs its
likely benefit.205 Thus, under the proposal, proportionality—first
introduced in a less-prominent form in the 1983 amendments to
Rule 26206—would take center stage in setting the scope of
discovery.
In their current form, the Rules require courts to consider
proportionality to limit discovery requests that are otherwise
within the permissible scope of Rule 26(b)(1) but nevertheless
impose a disproportionate burden.207 Current Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(i)–
(iii) allows courts to limit burdensome discovery, particularly
when its costs outweigh potential benefits to the case.208 For
instance, courts may consider whether discovery is “cumulative”
or “duplicative” or obtainable from a less-burdensome source.209
Likewise, courts must consider the needs of the case and the
importance of the issues when weighing the burdens imposed by
discovery.210
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s
claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.”).
205. See id. (stating these factors should be considered when determining
the proportionality of the scope of discovery).
206. See 1983 Amendments, supra note 183, at 217 (incorporating
proportionality into Rule 26, albeit not in the rule’s primary scope
provision).
207. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), (b)(2)(C)(iii) (mandating courts “limit
the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by
local rule if it determines that . . . the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit”).
208. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i)–(iii) (“On motion or on its own, the
court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by
these rules or by local rule if it determines that . . . the burden or expense of
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of
the case . . . .”).
209. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i) (requiring courts to limit the extent
of discovery if “the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or
duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive”).
210. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (listing the following factors to be
considered by courts when deciding whether to limit discovery: “[T]he needs of the
case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of
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The proposed amendments to Rule 26 would promote the
proportionality analysis to the primary scope provision of
26(b)(1).211 Currently, attorneys are expected to exercise
discretion to frame discovery requests within the scope allowed
by Rule 26(b)(1),212 and if they fail to do so, opposing counsel can
request limitations, or protections, from the court.213 Likewise,
current rule 26(g) mandates that attorneys who sign discovery
requests certify that the requests are, among other things,
proportional.214 If necessary, the court then exercises its
discretion to refine discovery along those same lines.215
The amendments, however, would emphasize attorneys’
obligation to consider what is proportional when they exercise
their discretion to frame discovery requests in the first place.216
the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues”).
211. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 80 (defining the “scope in
general” as “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense and proportional to the needs of the case”).
212. Under the 2000 amendments, attorneys have discretion to frame
requests relevant to any claim or defense of a party—a slightly narrower subset
of information than information relevant to the “subject matter of the action”
previously allowed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (explaining
the ramifications of allowing the prior broad scope of discovery, for instance,
“parties seek to justify discovery requests that sweep far beyond the claims and
defenses of the parties on the ground that they nevertheless have a bearing on
the ‘subject matter’ involved in the action”). Now, courts are given the discretion
to allow discovery relevant to the subject matter of the action. See FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(1) (permitting courts to widen the scope of discovery in this manner “for
good cause”); see also Singer, supra note 190, at 176–80 (discussing the shift
away from attorney discretion and toward judicial discretion in limiting pretrial
discovery).
213. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b), (c) (setting forth limitations on discovery in
subsection (b) and the protocol concerning motions for protective orders in
subsection (c)).
214. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) (requiring attorneys to affirm their requests
are “neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the
needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the
importance of the issues at stake in the action”).
215. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (allowing the court to limit the extent
of discovery when it determines “the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit”).
216. Cf. Singer, supra note 190, at 176–80 (noting the risks associated with
placing undue emphasis on attorneys’ discretion in discovery).
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The potential real-world impact of the proposed change is
subject to fierce debate. Over 2,300 public comments were filed
during the six-month comment period, some in favor of the
proposal, some opposed, and some hoping the Committee would
go further in limiting discovery.217
The Advisory Committee contends, contrary to many
comments, that defining the scope of discovery around the
proportionality concept merely reflects what is already in the
rule.218 According to the committee, the change “reinforces”
attorneys’ proportionality obligations.219 This reinforcement is
apparently necessary because many courts and attorneys were
not adhering to the proportionality concept when tailoring
discovery.220
At a minimum, the changes could prompt a wave of discovery
disputes based on allegations that discovery requests are not
proportional to the case. Reacting to the re-crafted scope
provision, litigants and courts will undoubtedly pay more heed to
proportionality.221
Taken together, the amendments, combined with continued
criticism of what some view as overbroad discovery, may create
momentum in some courts to narrow the scope of discovery
significantly, at least as a practical matter.222 For some
217. See Brostoff & Koelmay, supra note 198 (explaining, in response to this
issue, “Rule 26(b)(1) was modified before the public comment period so that
proportionality is now explicitly brought up early in the rule in the section
addressing scope of discovery”).
218. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 84 (asserting that “[r]estoring
the proportionality calculation to Rule 26(b)(1) does not change the existing
responsibilities of the court and the parties to consider proportionality”).
219. See id. (listing obligations such as considering proportionality “in
making discovery requests, responses, or objections”).
220. See id. at 82–83 (noting that “district judges have been reluctant to
limit the use of the discovery devices” as originally intended).
221. The proposed amendment would also delete the phrase, “[r]elevant
information need not be admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” from Rule 26’s scope
provision. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 70. The impact of such a change
is not clear, but some on the Advisory Committee contend that the phrase “was
never intended to expand the scope of discovery.” Brostoff & Koelmay, supra
note 198.
222. See, e.g., 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, §§ 2008, 2008.1 (describing
the modest impact of the discovery-scope amendments during the period from
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commentators, the changes are a tepid step toward international
litigation norms.223 Some in practice describe the potential
change as almost cataclysmic.224 The truth is probably
somewhere in the middle—the scope amendments will
substantially narrow discovery in some cases but will not, as
predicted by some, end pretrial litigation as we currently know
it.225
Narrowing the scope of discovery may create efficiency in
some cases. Avoiding wasteful re-discovery in similar cases would
undoubtedly create efficiency in a wide swath of complex cases.226
While the rule makers have chosen to focus on scope, courts
should turn their attention toward a unified approach to sharing.
Doing so would work in tandem with the proposed amendments.
The next Part examines the relationship between sharing and
proportionality and proposes some baseline sharing-protectiveorder principles.
IV. A Framework for Discovery Sharing
Courts and commentators are divided on the propriety of
discovery sharing and how best to accomplish it.227 The federal
1980–2000).
223. See Marcus, supra note 16, at 23–24 (“From the perspective of the rest
of the world, this package of changes is likely to seem very modest, perhaps
minimal.”).
224. See, e.g., Letter from Paul W. Mollica, to the Comm. on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, at 1 (Feb. 13, 2014)
[S]everal proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure will deprive litigants of the promise of the American
adversary process as the best means of ascertaining the truth and
minimizing error. Rather, they will front-load federal civil cases with
prefabricated conflicts that will disrupt orderly litigation and detract
from truth-finding.
(internal quotations and citations omitted) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
225. See Singer, supra note 190, at 149 (outlining the important roles that
attorney discretion and behavior play in achieving proportionality within the
discovery process).
226. See discussion supra Part III(C)(i) (discussing the positive impact of
sharing in products-liability cases).
227. See cases cited supra note 5 (demonstrating varying preferences among
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civil rules are silent on sharing, forcing courts to implement ad
hoc processes within the glow of Rule 26(c)’s “good cause”
standard.228 Courts, grasping in the dark for a framework,
sometimes deny requests for perfectly acceptable upfront
sharing provisions in protective orders. 229 In other instances,
courts may deny a request to modify a nonsharing protective
order to allow for sharing, following an out-of-touch
modification standard that imposes an unnecessarily onerous
burden.230
Hostility toward discovery sharing is contrary to both the
spirit of the Duke Conference and the goals of the proposed
civil amendments. 231 This Part proposes three basic discoverysharing principles and considers their interaction with current
law and the proposed amendments to Rule 26.

courts concerning discovery-sharing provisions); cf. Marcus, supra note 2, at 43
(arguing that a third-party litigant seeking access to discovery in cases to which
he is not a party should “demonstrate that he would have the right to obtain
them,” presumably in a modification proceeding); Campbell, supra note 2, at 824
(“[I]n the long run information sharing may actually waste judicial time and
resources.”); Timmins, supra note 92, at 1543 (“[I]nformation sharing avoids
duplicitous discovery while maintaining the secrecy required for the defendant’s
competitive interests.”).
228. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(g) (outlining when courts may “for good
cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense”); see also Parsons v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 726 n.1 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (“The federal rules do
not foreclose collaboration among litigants.”); Campbell, supra note 2, at 827
(“[I]nformation-sharing, while perhaps generally consistent with the directive of
Rule 1, at least when shared with other plaintiffs, is not specifically authorized
by the Rules.”).
229. See, e.g., Williams v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-0051-RWS, 2006 WL
1835437, at *2 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2006) (denying request for sharing provision
in protective order).
230. Knitting Fever, Inc. v. Coats Holdings Ltd., No. CV051065(DRH)(WDW), 2011 WL 3678823, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011) (relying
on Martindell’s extraordinary circumstances test to deny a request to modify a
protective order).
231. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 65–66 (“A principal conclusion
of the Duke conference was that discovery in civil litigation would more often
achieve the goal of Rule 1—the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action—through an increased emphasis on proportionality.”).
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A. Upfront Sharing Provisions Versus Later Modification
In most circumstances, upfront sharing provisions should
be favored over later ad hoc intervention and modification
requests. This principle has its root in Rule 26(c)’s good cause
requirement and operates within trial courts’ well-established
zone of protective-order discretion. 232 In most cases implicating
discovery-sharing concerns, evidence of good cause simply will
not support a protective order that forbids sharing at the
outset.233 To establish good cause for a protective order, the
party requesting the order must establish both that the
information it seeks to protect is confidential and that failure
to enter the order will result in substantial and serious
harm.234 The terms of the protective order should be no broader
than necessary to protect the requesting party from such
harm.235
The typical harm advanced by parties seeking protective
orders is economic or proprietary injury flowing from
dissemination of discovery information to competitors. 236
Protective orders that allow sharing prevent this harm in two
232. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (“The court may, for good cause, issue an order
to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense.”); Timmins, supra note 92, at 1507 (“After finding
good cause, the court must then evaluate each of the countervailing concerns to
determine whether the court should use the court’s discretion to grant a
protective order.”).
233. See 8A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 2035 (recognizing that specific
evidence of harm must support entry of an audience-limiting protective order).
234. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 149 F.3d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1998) (“To obtain a
protective order under Rule 26(c), the party resisting discovery must establish
that the information sought is covered by the rule and that it will be harmed by
disclosure.”); Bank of N.Y. v. Meridien BIAO Bank Tanz. Ltd., 171 F.R.D. 135,
143 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that the party must show “clearly defined and very
serious injury” to obtain protective order).
235. See Small v. Ramsey, 280 F.R.D. 264, 269 (N.D.W. Va. 2012) (stating
that the moving party “must demonstrate that the discovery sought lacks
relevance ‘to the extent that the likelihood and severity of the harm or
injury . . . outweighs any need for the information’”).
236. See, e.g., Petersen v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 1:06 CV 00108 TC
PMW, 2007 WL 914738, at *1 (D. Utah Mar. 5, 2007) (stating that failure to
enter protective order would result in “harmful disclosure of confidential and
proprietary information”).
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ways. First, the orders typically include a provision that
expressly forbids giving the information to the producing
party’s competitors, and violations are punishable by
contempt. 237 Second, the sharing provision itself could be
narrowly tailored to allow for sharing only with cases
involving a strong factual similarity to the case in which the
order is entered. 238 Excluding competitors from the sharing
class obviates the most likely (and often only) cognizable
source of harm flowing from the disclosure of discovery
information. 239
Many courts continue to enter nonsharing orders, even in
the face of sharing requests. 240 The reasoning for doing so
varies, but a common trend has been for courts, particularly
federal courts, to deny upfront sharing provisions in favor of
requiring litigants in similar cases to intervene and modify a
nonsharing protective order. 241 Not only is this approach at
237. Cf., e.g., Pincheira v. Allstate Ins. Co., 190 P.3d 322, 337 (N.M. 2008)
(“Ordinarily a protective order should permit discovery sharing among other
litigants and witnesses, who are not competitors of the defendant. . . .” (emphasis
added)).
238. Cf., e.g., Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Super. Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr.
2d 885, 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that, under the terms of a sharing
protective order, “plaintiff’s attorney may share this discovery only with counsel
in other similar cases, it must be assumed that the information is also
discoverable in these other similar cases”).
239. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 774 (noting that the dissemination of
discovery information means “[c]ompetitors will then have ready access to the
company’s internal decision-making procedures and to other highly sensitive
information”).
240. See, e.g., Menendez ex rel. Menendez v. Wal-Mart Stores E. LP, No.
1:10-CV-53, 2012 WL 90140, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 11, 2012) (denying request for
sharing order and finding that “any purported gain in judicial efficiency
achieved in other cases through ‘sharing orders’ is purely hypothetical” in case).
241. See, e.g., Long v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc., No. CV-09-2209-PHXDGC, 2010 WL 1740831, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010) (holding that sharing
provision would circumvent required modification procedure); Petersen v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 1:06 CV 00108 TC PMW, 2007 WL 914738, at *1 (D.
Utah Mar. 5, 2007)
The court is not persuaded that the inclusion of [a sharing] provision
is either appropriate or necessary. Such sharing requests can and
should be considered on an ‘as-needed’ basis throughout the course of
the litigation, rather than ‘opening the barn doors’ with a broad order
at this stage, which is anything but “protective.”
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odds with Rule 26(c)’s requirement that the breadth of a
protective order be supported by evidence of good cause, but it
also imposes burdens on the system with no correlative
benefits.
Upfront sharing provisions are more efficient than later
intervention and modification. First, upfront sharing
provisions reduce litigation about discovery. 242 When properly
crafted, discovery-sharing provisions avoid satellite discovery
disputes by allowing parties to share discovery without any
further court intervention. 243 In contrast, each litigant who
seeks to share in already completed discovery in a case
governed by a nonsharing order must intervene and file a
motion to modify the order. 244 This process not only
discourages litigants from utilizing shared discovery in the
first place but also creates an unnecessary discovery
dispute. 245
These disputes often arise from a requirement in some
courts that parties seeking to modify a protective order
demonstrate that the information they seek through sharing

242. See Singer, supra note 190, at 166–67 (describing a 2009 “study of
closed civil cases by the Federal Judicial Center, 63.8% of plaintiffs’ attorneys
and 61% of defense attorneys agreed that the parties in their cases ‘were able to
reduce the cost and burden [of the named case] of discovery through
cooperation.’”).
243. See, e.g., Kamp Implement Co., v. J.I. Case Co., 630 F. Supp. 218, 220
(D. Mont. 1986) (“If defendants’ proposed [nonsharing] order were entered, the
court would be faced with motions by litigants in other cases for modification of
the order to allow the information to be released to them. This would result in
duplication of time and effort in each instance where discovery is sought.”); cf.,
e.g., Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 580 (D. Colo. 1982) (“Each plaintiff
should not have to undertake to discover anew the basic evidence that other
plaintiffs have uncovered.”).
244. See, e.g., Long, 2010 WL 1740831, at *1 (stating that collateral litigants
“should not be granted automatic access to a defendant’s confidential
documents” and must “go through the appropriate steps to obtain that
discovery”).
245. This effect proves counter to the scope and purpose of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (asserting the Rules “should be
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding”).
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is discoverable in their own case. 246 The approach is rooted in
comity concerns and concerns about forum shopping. 247
Indeed, several courts have resisted sharing orders on the
ground that sharing provisions have the potential to thwart
the discovery limitations of the jurisdictions in which
litigants receive shared information. 248 According to this line
of reasoning, crafty litigants stuck in a jurisdiction with
limited discovery could find a similar case with a sharing
order in a jurisdiction with more liberal discovery standards.
By doing so, the litigant might obtain information to which he
or she would not otherwise be entitled. Accordingly, some
courts deny sharing requests in favor of litigant-by-litigant
modification. 249
This process and the reasoning underlying it are flawed for
several reasons. Even if an upfront sharing provision ignores
discovery limitations in a collateral case, it does not harm the
246. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 2, at 43 (arguing that third-party litigant
seeking to modify protective order should establish that “he would have the
right to obtain” discovery in collateral action); 8A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 16,
§ 2044.1 (“If the limitation on discovery in the collateral litigation would be
substantially subverted by allowing access to discovery material under a
protective order, the court should be inclined to deny modification.”); cf. Foltz v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he
collateral litigant must demonstrate the relevance of the protected discovery to
the collateral proceedings and its general discoverability therein. Requiring a
showing of relevance prevents collateral litigants from gaining access to
discovery materials merely to subvert limitations on discovery in another
proceeding.”).
247. See, e.g., Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1133 (“Allowing the parties to the collateral
litigation to raise specific relevance and privilege objections to the production of
any otherwise properly protected materials in the collateral courts further
serves to prevent the subversion of limitations on discovery in the collateral
proceedings.”).
248. See, e.g., Bertetto v. Eon Labs, Inc., No. 06-1136 JCH/ACT, 2008 WL
2522571 (D.N.M. May 29, 2008) (stating that sharing provisions would
“potentially usurp . . . a collateral court’s role in managing discovery in a
collateral case”); see also Cordis Corp. v. O’Shea, 988 So. 2d 1163, 1167 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (“Allowing this degree of sharing of confidential information
may provide a mechanism for attorneys in states with narrower discovery laws
to evade their state law discovery limitations . . . .”).
249. See, e.g., Cordis Corp., 988 So. 2d at 1167 (noting that “not every
federal court decision has approved sharing confidential information even with
collateral litigants or counsel”).
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producing party in a way recognized by Rule 26(c). When
previously produced information is shared, the producing party
has presumably already expended resources to complete the
discovery in the sharing jurisdiction. The collateral party
receiving the shared information is responsible to pay to copy the
documents.250 Moreover, the party benefiting from sharing will
almost always be required to agree to be bound by the terms of
the protective order (e.g., use the documents only to prepare and
try the collateral case).251 If anything, the producing party has
saved expense and time in the collateral case.252 The system has
undoubtedly benefited, particularly if the party receiving the
shared information is able to exercise her discretion better in
framing discovery requests in the collateral case or avoid some
requests altogether.
Perhaps the producing party could complain that the
collateral party received undue access to information that helped
prove her case. But discovery limitations are meant only to
balance the search for truth against the cost of that search, not to
serve as a shield against liability.253 Moreover, the scope of
discovery is necessarily broader than the standard for
admissibility.254 If shared discovery yields relevant, admissible

250. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (“The conditions may
also include payment by the requesting party of part or all of the reasonable
costs of obtaining information from sources that are not reasonably
accessible.”).
251. See Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Super. Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d
885, 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (describing a protective order with a typical
sharing provision, tailored to ensure compliance by counsel receiving the shared
documents).
252. See Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 580 (D. Colo. 1982)
(observing that sharing protective orders save defendant expense in time that
would otherwise be spent on duplicative discovery in similar cases).
253. Cf. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507–08 (1947) (delineating
circumstances in discovery which could cause “the rights of individual litigants
[to be] drained of vitality and the lawsuit [to become] more of a battle of
deception than a search for truth”).
254. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (allowing “[p]arties [to] obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense” even inadmissible information).
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evidence, the receiving jurisdiction’s trial process has been
enhanced, not thwarted.255
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what complaint the court in
the receiving jurisdiction might have. If anything, the court in the
receiving jurisdiction has had its interests furthered by the
sharing protective order, particularly if the sharing jurisdiction
has allowed broad discovery.256 With more proof available,
attorneys may be less likely to engage in discovery disputes in the
receiving jurisdiction, saving resources for that court. And more
information, rather than less, is almost always beneficial in
seeking truth.257 When that information comes to the collateral
court essentially free of cost via a previously litigated case, it is
hard to imagine the downside.
One legitimate concern, albeit unlikely to occur often, is that
attorneys engaged in national-scale claims might seek out a
jurisdiction with unusually liberal discovery standards and create
a discovery mill for other claims around the country.258
Presumably, the attorneys could file an action, obtain favorable
discovery rulings, obtain a sharing protective order, and then use
the jurisdiction to feed cases around the country, notwithstanding
the merits of the collateral sharing case.
At the outset, there are almost no identified instances of this
hypothetical occurring. In the event that a court had evidence of
such a scheme, it would have ample discretion to deny a sharing
255. See Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. 1987) (“Shared
discovery is an effective means to insure full and fair disclosure. Parties subject
to a number of suits concerning the same subject matter are forced to be
consistent in their responses by the knowledge that their opponents can
compare those responses.”).
256. Cf. Patterson v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F.R.D. 152, 154 (W.D. Tex. 1980)
(“The availability of the discovery information may reduce time and money
which must be expended in similar proceedings, and may allow for effective,
speedy, and efficient representation.”).
257. See Garcia, 734 S.W.2d at 347 (“[T]he ultimate purpose of discovery is
to seek the truth, so that disputes may be decided by what the facts reveal, not
by what facts are concealed.”).
258. See Cordis Corp. v. O’Shea, 988 So. 2d 1163, 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008) (warning that permitting parties to share confidential information “may
provide a mechanism for attorneys in states with narrower discovery laws to
evade their state law discovery limitations by obtaining confidential
information” from a more liberal jurisdiction).
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provision in the first place or modify an existing protective order
to shut the discovery mill down.259 Utilizing a case primarily as a
vehicle for obtaining information to overrun other jurisdiction’s
discovery limitations—rather than to work toward a resolution on
the merits—would be inappropriate.260 But the mere specter of
such abuse does not constitute reason to abandon discovery
sharing in favor of ad hoc modification, particularly when courts
have ample tools to deal with any instances that do arise.261
Nevertheless, the discoverability requirement is a predicate
to sharing in many jurisdictions.262 As a result, parties forced to
seek modification of protective orders may, in essence, litigate
disputes about discoverability substantially similar to those they
would face in their own cases. Upfront sharing provisions could
avoid the problem altogether.
Beyond the direct efficiencies generated by sharing
provisions, the provisions also provide some indirect, systemic
benefits. Indeed, up-front sharing provisions encourage party
cooperation and efficiency in the long run by avoiding reliance
problems and properly setting party expectations at the inception
of protective orders.263 Later protective-order modifications often
fall short in this regard.264
259. See, e.g., Patterson v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F.R.D. 152, 154 (W.D. Tex.
1980) (“Unless it can be shown that the discovering party is exploiting the
instant litigation solely to assist litigation in a foreign forum, federal courts
allow full use of the information in other forums.”).
260. See id. (highlighting the primary aim of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action”).
261. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (permitting courts to sanction parties for failing
to comply with court orders); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3) (providing that a court may
impose appropriate sanctions on a party or party’s attorney for violating the
certification standards for discovery requests and disclosures).
262. See, e.g., Long v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc., No. CV-09-2209-PHXDGC, 2010 WL 1740831, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010) (“[T]he collateral litigant
must demonstrate the relevance of the protected discovery to the collateral
proceedings and its general discoverability therein.”).
263. See, e.g., Diversified Grp., Inc. v. Daugerdas, 217 F.R.D. 152, 158
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting one court’s “restrictive attitude toward modification of
protective orders” and arguing that “[i]f protective orders were easily
modified, . . . parties would be less forthcoming in giving testimony and less
willing to settle their disputes”).
264. See, e.g., id. (“Where there has been reasonable reliance by a party on a
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Courts considering protective-order modification requests
regularly struggle with questions about reliance.265 Courts often
hesitate to grant modifications to allow sharing after the parties
have produced information to each other in reliance on a
confidentiality order.266 The basis for this hesitation is that the
parties produced the information with the expectation that it
would be used only for the case at hand.267
By defeating party expectations about confidentiality, so the
logic goes, litigants will be less likely to produce information
under protective orders in the future, causing inefficiency and
other problems for the discovery system as a whole.268 As
discussed in Part IV.B, this reasoning may overstate the impact
of defeated protective order expectations.
Whatever the true extent and impact of the reliance problem,
sharing protective orders avoid questions about reliance
altogether in most cases.269 When a court enters a protective
order with a well-crafted sharing provision, all parties to the
order know, to a large extent, who may receive information under
protective order, a district court should not modify the order ‘absent a showing
of improvidence in the grant of [the] order or some extraordinary circumstance
or compelling need.’”).
265. See Olympic Ref. Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 264 (9th Cir. 1964)
(noting acts committed by the defendants “in reliance upon the entry and
continuing effectiveness of the protective orders”), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900
(1964).
266. See Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 293 (2d Cir.
1979) (rejecting the Government’s modification request due to the opposing
party’s reliance on the prior order).
267. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 772–75 (explaining that “[t]he number
and variety of potential adversaries may make the ramifications of unfettered
dissemination of discovery information overwhelming”); Marcus, supra note 2,
at 43–44 (arguing that “a court should ordinarily deny nonparty access if all the
parties to litigation number one oppose it, even though it may increase the
nonparty’s expenses”).
268. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 772–75 (addressing potential risks to
litigants resulting from “[t]he uncontrolled dissemination of discovery
information among an ill-defined and untraceable amalgam of adversaries” and
why this would lead to lessened efficiency); Marcus, supra note 2, at 43–44
(noting that parties who foresee repeated claims may “fight discovery more
vigorously”).
269. See Timmins, supra note 92, at 1520 (noting that “protective orders
that allow information sharing can substantially reduce the burdens that the
discovery process imposes on the plaintiff”).
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that order. The increased certainty flowing from settled party
expectations about litigant-to-litigant sharing may even, by itself,
increase party willingness to provide forthright and complete
discovery responses.270
In sum, in many cases, particularly products-liability and
mass tort cases, later requests from collateral litigants to modify
protective orders are perfectly foreseeable and avoidable.271
Courts should set reasonable party expectations by entering
sharing protective orders that account for this reality at the
outset.272
For some courts, the practice of sharing privileged
information across jurisdictions presents special difficulties.
Privileges are often based on policy judgments meant to influence
real-world behavior.273 They represent particular jurisdictions’
views on how to best maintain and further society, not simply run
a court system.274 These policy views manifest themselves in
privileges by limiting litigant and court access to information.
In contrast, Rule 26(c)(1)(g) is aimed at limiting the audience
for materials that have already been, or will be, found
discoverable.275 The focus of the protective order rules across
jurisdictions (largely based on Rule 26(c)) is unquestionably
270. See Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 347–48 (Tex. 1987) (explaining
that the goals of discovery are “often frustrated by the adversarial approach to
discovery,” and that “[s]hared discovery is an effective means to insure full and
fair disclosure”).
271. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 827 (“Particularly in products liability
cases, plaintiffs often routinely move to modify protective orders at the close of
litigation . . . .”).
272. See id. at 831 (criticizing umbrella protective orders which do not
account for this possibility).
273. See 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 5:2 (4th ed. 2013) (“Privilege rules occupy a unique place because
they implement policies that are very different from those underlying other
rules, and many privileges are broader in effect than other rules.”).
274. See id. (noting that privileges “are not designed to enhance the
reliability of factfinding, and they exclude evidence that may be probative
because other values are more important than finding truth in litigation”).
275. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G) (allowing courts to issue a protective
order “requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development,
or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified
way”).
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important but is simultaneously more value-neutral and more
homogenous on value questions than the privilege rules.276
For instance, the spousal privilege reflects the judgment that
marriage is a good that the government should promote.277 The
clerical privilege recognizes that candor between priest and
parishioner, and the spiritual enlightenment that might follow, is
good for society.278
As one might expect, the disagreements about the value
judgments underlying privileges have produced substantial
disparity in privilege law. Some jurisdictions recognize the
physician–patient privilege while others do not.279 Even when
lawmakers in different jurisdictions agree about the existence of
a privilege, the contours of its applicability may vary
dramatically.280 Adding to the complexity in the area, privileges
are largely the province of state law in civil cases, even in federal
courts.281 The fifty states have come to widely varying conclusions
on privilege questions, an unsurprising result that reflects the
political and moral diversity of the country.

276. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences
of Friendship, 1984 DUKE L.J. 631, 662 (stating that privileges “lie at the center
of the contemporary debate about the foundations of liberal society” and that
“[t]o privilege certain relationships is to declare certain values”).
277. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958)
The basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband or
husband against wife in a trial where life or liberty is at stake was a
belief that such a policy was necessary to foster family peace, not only
for the benefit of husband, wife and children, but for the benefit of the
public as well.
278. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (“The priestpenitent privilege recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual
counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts
or thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in return.”).
279. Compare CAL. EVID. CODE § 994 (West 2008) (describing physician–
patient privilege), with United States v. Moore, 970 F.2d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1992)
(“This Court has . . . concluded that there is no doctor-patient privilege under
federal law.”).
280. Compare TEX. R. EVID. 509 (applying the physician–patient privilege in
civil, not criminal, cases), with CAL. EVID. CODE § 300, 994 (applying the
physician–patient privilege in criminal and civil cases).
281. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (“But in a civil case, state law governs privilege
regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.”).

PROPORTIONALITY, PRETRIAL CONFIDENTIALITY

2237

But these value judgments are not implicated by protectiveorder procedures. If a privilege applies and prevents disclosure in
discovery, an audience-limiting protective order simply is not
necessary. Indeed, if a privilege keeps information out of
discovery, there is simply nothing to protect.
On the other hand, if one state’s privilege law in a particular
area (or lack thereof) allows disclosure of information that would
be privileged in another state, and no court enters a protective
order, the first state’s privilege law may thwart the second’s.282
The same is true if a court in a state where information is not
privileged allows discovery sharing with cases in states where
privilege would limit disclosure. The information still would not
reach the general public (because the collateral party presumably
received the information by agreeing to the protective-order’s
restrictions against further disclosure); but it would be available
for litigation purposes, contrary to the receiving jurisdiction’s
privilege law.283
One response to this might be simply that the states often
thwart one another’s policy judgments, an undeniable reality of a
multi-sovereign republic. The disparity in privilege law, largely
recognized as appropriately within the discretion of state
lawmakers or courts, might be more the culprit here than the
sharing order. Indeed, the court in the sharing jurisdiction was
not obligated to enter a protective order at all.284 And if it had
refused to grant any confidentiality, its previous privilege ruling
would have, in itself, thwarted the policy of the receiving
jurisdiction by allowing would-be privileged information to flow
in.
In this same way, Colorado’s policy legalizing marijuana
thwarts the criminal justice policy of its neighbor states when
282. See 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 273, § 5.8 (delineating which
state’s privilege laws apply).
283. The party holding the privilege may, of course, still contest the
admissibility of the information at trial. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 10, at 496
(“[S]haring is consistent with a settled doctrine exempting exchange of
information between litigants with a common litigation opponent from the risk
that the exchange will be deemed a waiver of privileges.”).
284. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) (“Rule
26(c) confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order
is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.”).
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Colorado-grown pot flows across the border.285 Rather than
serving as a reason to limit discovery sharing, tension among
states’ privilege law may simply be an inevitable by-product of
states’ recognized ability to make their own policy choices.
Another version of the privilege problem comes up when
sharing courts order parties to produce information pursuant to a
qualified privilege.286 The trade-secret privilege provides an apt
example. Many states qualify the trade secret privilege to allow
courts to compel production of otherwise privileged information
where failing to do so would “conceal fraud” or otherwise create
“an injustice.”287 The burden is often placed on the party seeking
the privileged information to establish that injustice or
concealment of a fraud would occur absent disclosure in the
case.288
Some argue that when courts allow sharing in trade-secret
cases without requiring such a showing, the protective-order
ruling might actually conflict with the sharing jurisdiction’s own
privilege law.289 Many states’ privileges not only allow the party
holding the privilege to refuse to provide the information absent a
showing of injustice or fraud, but also to prevent others from
doing so.290 A sharing protective order in such a jurisdiction,
285. See, e.g., Jack Healy, After 5 Months of Sales, Colorado Sees the
Downside of a Legal High, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1kjtwf8
(last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (highlighting that some law enforcement officials in
neighboring states that have seen an increase in marijuana-related offenses) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
286. See Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P. v. Endicott, 81 So. 3d 486, 490 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2011) (addressing the tension between sharing protective orders and
state trade-secret privilege).
287. Id.
288. See, e.g., id. (stating that “sharing provisions, like the underlying one,
which allow the dissemination of trade secrets without considering these factors
codified” under Florida law “are per se unlawful”).
289. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.506 (West 1995) (attempting to
circumvent the conflict between disclosure and privilege by directing courts to
“take protective measures that the interests of the holder of the
privilege . . . require” when directing disclosure of such holder’s trade secret).
290. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.506 (“A person has a privilege to refuse to
disclose, and to prevent other persons from disclosing, a trade secret owned by
that person if the allowance of the privilege will not conceal fraud or otherwise
work injustice.”); see also, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37
(1984) (holding that a protective order “entered on a showing of good cause as
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according to some, could potentially undermine the privilege in
all future cases within the sharing provision after the first
case.291
But in the trade-secret-privilege context, these concerns
conflate two separate issues and overstate the concern. First, the
question of whether material is discoverable or not because of a
privilege is distinct from concerns about limiting the proper
audience for the material through protective orders.292 If a court
orders a party to produce otherwise privileged information
because failing to do so would be “an injustice,” and does not
enter a protective order, the information could be disseminated to
the general public.
Of course, the inquiries inform one another. A court should
consider the efficacy of protective measures when deciding to
order production of trade secrets or other privileged
information.293 Whether to enter such an order, however, is a
Rule 26(c) question, subject to the trial court’s broad discretion,
not a privilege question. This distinction means that Rule 26(c)’s
good cause standard, not privilege law, governs the size of the
audience for trade-secret information a court has deemed
discoverable.
Moreover, protective orders that account for similarity
between the sharing case and receiving case adequately account
for trade secret holders’ interests. Well-crafted sharing orders
allow sharing only with factually similar litigation.294 Thus, the
required by Rule 26(c), . . . limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, [that]
does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other
sources” does not violate the First Amendment); Moskowitz, supra note 67, 824–
25 (discussing the role of good cause in granting protective orders).
291. See Wal-Mart Stores, 81 So. 3d at 490 (“Sharing provisions, like the
underlying one, which allow the dissemination of trade secrets without
considering [the operation of the privilege] are per se unlawful.”).
292. Cf., e.g, Chapa v. Garcia, 848 S.W.2d 667, 673 n.8 (Tex. 1992) (Doggett,
J., concurring) (“While discoverability by the parties is often confused with
disclosability to the public, discoverability and disclosability issues must be
resolved separately.”).
293. See In re Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Tex. 1998)
(holding that courts should enter appropriate protective order after determining
whether to order production of trade secret information).
294. See, e.g., Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Super. Ct., 45 Cal. Rptr.
2d 885, 886 (Cal Ct. App. 1995) (providing an example of a protective order that
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shared information is likely necessary and relevant in the
receiving case, satisfying the “injustice” prong of the trade-secret
privilege.295 If the discovery is relevant and necessary in one case
involving a defective widget that injured a person it likely has a
sufficient connection to another case involving the same widget
that injured another person.
In essence, if the court compels disclosure of trade-secret
information and simultaneously grants a protective order that
allows sharing with similar cases, it has implicitly ruled that the
information is necessary for the proper preparation of all cases
within the sharing class.
To the extent the court has concerns about the relevance and
necessity in cases receiving the information, it can address those
concerns by narrowing the sharing class, not eliminating it
entirely. An approach that allows appropriate sharing of tradesecret information, pursuant to a thoughtful and well-crafted
sharing order, is consistent with the qualified trade-secret
privilege.
Second, courts have long recognized that the trade-secret
privilege is qualified rather than absolute.296 Indeed, prominent
commentators have recognized that protection for trade secrets is
not a “true” privilege because trade secrets are “generally
discoverable where they are relevant to the dispute.”297 In many
jurisdictions, the showings necessary to trigger compelled
disclosure of trade secrets because of “injustice” boil down to
something more than, but akin to, relevance.298 Courts take this
allowed sharing of information “in other pending similar litigation”).
295. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.506 (stating that information may only fall
within the trade-secret provision “if the allowance of the privilege will
not . . . otherwise work an injustice”).
296. See, e.g., Bleacher v. Bristol-Myers Co., 163 A.2d 526, 529 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1960) (“Before a court will order a manufacturer to divulge information
relating to a secret process or formula of his product, it must be clearly shown
that the information required is relevant to the issue, not otherwise available
and necessary in the proof of plaintiff’s case.”).
297. 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 274, § 5:49.
298. See, e.g., Bleacher, 163 A.2d at 529 (finding the plaintiff entitled to the
trade secret information necessary to prove her case); see also 2 MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 274, § 5:49 (“The term ‘privilege’ appears in this
setting, but there is no ‘true’ privilege simply because trade secrets and
competitive information are generally discoverable where they are relevant to
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lenient approach because the trade-secret privilege works in
tandem with protective orders to keep information from
competitors.
The purpose of the privilege is to preserve the value of tradesecret information by forbidding its disclosure to the privilege
holder’s economic foes.299 Almost all sharing orders forbid
dissemination to the disclosing party’s competitors. By doing so,
the orders protect the value of the disclosing party’s secrets. It is
well established that compelling the disclosure of trade secrets in
litigation subject to a protective order that prevents competitors
from accessing the information is appropriate.300
B. Modification Standards
To the extent courts use nonsharing protective orders,
collateral litigants should be able to obtain easy access to
discovery for use in related cases. Most courts to consider the
issue take this liberal approach, championed by Wilk v. American
Medical Association.301 Wilk’s presumption in favor of modifying
the dispute.”). But see In re Cont’l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d at 613–14
(rejecting the argument that mere relevance is enough to overcome qualified
trade secret privilege); cf. 26 WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 5651 (1st ed. 2010) (stating that the concept of “injustice” in the qualified
trade-secret context “expanded in the caselaw to any situation in which the facts
cannot be ascertained without disclosure of the trade secrets” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
299. See, e.g., In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003) (“[A] trade secret
is any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in
one’s business and presents an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know or use it.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
300. See, e.g., Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Merrill, 443
U.S. 340, 362 n.24 (1979) (“Actually, orders forbidding any disclosure of trade
secrets or confidential commercial information are rare. More commonly, the
trial court will enter a protective order restricting disclosure to counsel. . . .”).
301. 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980) (“[W]here an appropriate
modification of a protective order can place private litigants in a position they
would otherwise reach only after repetition of another’s discovery, such
modification can be denied only where it would tangibly prejudice substantial
rights of the party opposing modification.”), superseded by rule as stated in Bond
v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 2009); see also, e.g., Foltz v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Wilk with approval
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protective orders to aid collateral litigation best supports Rule 1
interests, as highlighted at the Duke Conference and in the
proposed civil rules amendments.302
Some courts, however, disagree and continue to impose an
unduly high barrier to modifying protective orders.303 The
primary justification for doing so is the supposed harm to parties
that have produced information in reliance on the order.304 But
reality belies this reasoning. First, many protective orders are
stipulated umbrella orders, rubberstamped by a court.305 By their
very terms, these orders allow any party to the case to challenge
the “confidentiality” of a document.306 If a court sustains the
challenge, the document is immediately stripped of protection. It
is hard to envision how a party might view such an order as a
guarantee of confidentiality and thereby rely on it.307 Any party
producing putatively confidential documents under an umbrella

and requiring something less than Martindell’s extraordinary circumstances
test); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 790 (3d Cir. 1994)
(rejecting extraordinary circumstances test as too strict); United Nuclear Corp.
v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1428 (10th Cir. 1990) (adopting the
standard in Wilk); Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 775 N.W.2d 302, 309–10 (Iowa
2009) (adopting the less stringent test from Wilk).
302. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 77 (amending Rule 1 to
emphasize that the parties, as well as the courts, have the responsibility to
“secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action”).
303. See Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir.
1979) (requiring “a showing of improvidence in the grant of a Rule 26(c)
protective order or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need” to
disclose information under the umbrella of a protective order).
304. See id. (rejecting a government attempt to modify a protective order
where parties relied on the order in providing testimony that would otherwise
be privileged under the 5th Amendment).
305. See Howard M. Erichson, Court-Ordered Confidentiality in Discovery,
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 357, 357 (2006) (“Disturbingly, some courts routinely sign
orders which contain confidentiality clauses without considering the propriety of
such orders, or the countervailing public interests which are sacrificed by the
orders.” (citing Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 785 (3d. Cir.
1994))).
306. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 500–02 (describing, with approval, the
operation of umbrella protective orders).
307. See id. at 502 (“Admittedly, the court may find the fact that an
umbrella order has been used bears on reasonable reliance issues if modification
of the order is sought. . . .”).
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order is taking a leap of faith, not relying on a promise of future
secrecy.
Second, it is well known that courts frequently modify
protective orders to allow third parties to use discovery
information in similar collateral litigation, particularly in
products-liability litigation.308 Indeed, many protective orders
specifically indicate that the court retains jurisdiction to modify
the order even after the primary litigation has ended. To the
extent any party relies on an order expressly indicating it is
subject to modification in a litigation system that frequently
modifies orders for litigation-related use, such reliance is
unreasonable.
Even if a party relies on a protective order for confidentiality,
any harm flowing from a modification to allow information to be
used in related litigation is minimal or nonexistent in most cases.
Only two sources of harm typically flow from sharing-related
modifications. Neither justifies an onerous modification standard.
First, a party that produced inculpatory information in the
sharing case may be held accountable in a receiving case for the
real-world misconduct the shared information reveals. While this
is undoubtedly undesirable for the producing party, courts should
not resist modifying protective orders to aid parties in escaping
liability in subsequent cases.309 It is true that litigants sometimes
escape liability as a by-product of the rules’ goals (e.g., when a
rule precludes disclosure of a damning fact for the sake of
minimizing discovery’s burdens or protecting another process),
but minimizing liability for misconduct is not an appropriate use
of the discovery rules.310
Many courts have lauded discovery sharing’s capability to
hold defendants accountable for varying discovery responses

308. See id. at 498 (acknowledging courts’ willingness to modify orders
makes reliance less reasonable in many cases).
309. Cf. Dore, supra note 1, at 363 (arguing that protective orders should not
be used to shield against liability).
310. See also United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682
(1958) (discussing the great need for grand jury transcripts to be kept
confidential); cf. Dore, supra note 1, at 363 (arguing that protective orders
should not be used as shield against liability).
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across different cases.311 Better holding defendants accountable
for the real-world conduct that led to litigation seems to be an
even more fundamental benefit of shared discovery. To the extent
parties produce information in one case in reliance on a protective
order to shield them from an inculpatory disclosure in a future
case, their reliance is not detrimental in a sense that Rule 26
should recognize.312
A second harm Rule 26 might recognize is an increased risk
of public disclosure, potentially undermining the competitive
value of information.313 When a protective order is modified, the
audience of litigants and attorneys widens. Each additional
person who receives the information makes it slightly more likely
that someone violates the order’s terms and disseminates the
information to a broad, even public, audience.314 The potential for
mass dissemination may arguably be more acute in the Internet
age, when one rogue recipient could disseminate an entire
discovery production to a global audience.315
Nevertheless, experience has shown that the risk of such
misconduct is minimal. During the more than forty years of the
modern protective-order regime (including almost twenty years in
311. See In re Abbott Labs. Sec. Litig., No. 92 C 3869, 1993 WL 616693, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 1993) (stating that discovery sharing “allows plaintiffs’
counsel to verify that they, in their respective cases, have in fact received all of
the documentation they are entitled to”).
312. But see Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 295–96 (2d
Cir. 1979) (finding that the district court erred in allowing the Government to
obtain protected testimony because “a witness should be entitled to rely upon
the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties” otherwise such
witnesses would be “inhibited from giving essential testimony in civil
litigation”).
313. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 824 (discussing the potential for “serious
problems of policing and enforcement” of protective orders and noting that
“[o]nce the information has been transferred beyond the limits of the jurisdiction
where it was originally discovered, the court’s contempt power will no longer
reach those in its possession”).
314. See id. (“[T]he likelihood of violation, inadvertent or otherwise, will
increase in direct proportion to the number of disclosures.”).
315. See Marder, supra note 26, at 318 (observing that with the existence of
the Internet “the reach of ‘public’ has expanded, and the consequences of any
mistaken disclosure are far greater than when the ‘public’ meant an individual
who went down to the courthouse . . . and then returned the document” after
reading it).
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the Internet age), notable protective order violations are
relatively rare.316 The relatively low number of serious violations
likely stems from the serious consequences imposed on attorneys
who violate orders. Contempt is one possible sanction.317 A less
recognized informal punishment, but one that may serve as a
serious deterrent, is the likely use of an attorney’s protectiveorder violation as evidence in other courts to prevent that same
attorney, or expert, from obtaining access to discovery in future
cases.318 This informal sanction could undermine a protectiveorder violator’s livelihood.
Moreover, harm flowing from reliance on an order modified
to allow yet-to-occur future violations is speculative.319 When
courts assess the detriments of a modification, they should focus
on actual or likely harm, not low-level possibilities.320 Protectiveorder violations are rare, but unauthorized disclosure to a
competitor of a producing party as the result of a protective-order
modification is almost unheard of.

316. Some violations have occurred over the years, but courts have displayed
robust willingness to enforce their orders. Relative to the tens of thousands of
protective orders issued during the Rule 26(c) era, the number of violations
remains small. But see Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 685
F.3d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding sanctions for inadvertent violation
when attorneys had unintentionally disseminated materials via a CD provided
to a plaintiffs’ conference audience); McDonald v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 186
F. App’x 930, 932 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding violation of protective order); Nevil v.
Ford Motor Co., No. CV 294-015, 1999 WL 1338625, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 23,
1999) (finding expert in contempt when expert disclosed information about
protected documents in collateral litigation).
317. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 50, at 348 (noting that “contempt of court”
is a potential punishment for violating a protective order).
318. Defendants are not shy about using past protective-order violations
against the violator to urge courts not to grant access to information. See
Defendant Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel & in Support of Cooper’s Motion for a Protective
Order at 45, Richards v. Ford Motor Co., No. 310958/2011, 2013 WL 6096311
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 9, 2011) (emphasizing that the “[p]laintiffs’ retained tire
expert, Dennis Carlson, has been sanctioned previously” for violating a
protective order).
319. See, e.g., Timmins, supra note 92, at 1523 (noting that courts have held
that risk of harm through future disclosure is “entirely speculative”).
320. See, e.g., Parsons v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 726 (N.D. Ga.
1980).
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Beyond the harm accruing to a particular litigant from
relying on a later-modified protective order, some courts have
considered negative impacts on the system that might flow from
modifying an order. That was the scenario in Martindell, where
the Second Circuit required extraordinary circumstances to
modify an order to allow civil discovery to be used in a criminal
prosecution.321 Several witnesses relied on the protective order at
issue when deciding not to exercise their Fifth Amendment right
not to testify at a deposition.322
The court understandably worried that modifying the order
would deter future litigants in the same situation from
cooperating in civil discovery, particularly when criminal liability
loomed in the background.323 This reasoning doubtless has
common sense appeal—knowing that a protective order might be
modified to accommodate prosecutors would cause most people to
refuse to testify by invoking the Fifth.
The gap in the court’s reasoning, however, is twofold. First, it
is less than clear that future witnesses would know about the
previous protective order modification. Second, most cases do not
involve discovery that has a dual-purpose use as both civil
discovery and high-stakes criminal evidence, making the specter
of widespread discovery resistance unlikely in regular
circumstances.324 In the absence of empirical evidence to the
contrary, it seems unreasonable to assume that parties engaged
in ordinary civil litigation will resist discovery to a greater extent
than they would have anyway because of a possible protectiveorder modification.
321. See Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir.
1979) (discussing the reasons the “information in question” was not found to be
confidential).
322. See id. at 295–96.
323. See id. (“In short, witnesses might be expected frequently to refuse to
testify pursuant to protective orders if their testimony were to be made
available to the Government for criminal investigatory purposes in disregard of
those orders.”).
324. Cf. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 147 (2d Cir.
1987) (finding that, in contrast to the deponents in Martindell, the proponents of
continued protection in this case “could not have relied on the permanence of the
protective order”), superseded by statute as stated in Iridium India Telecom Ltd.
v. Motorola, Inc., 165 F. App’x 878 (2d Cir. 2005).
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The Wilk court appropriately created a presumption in favor
of modifying protective orders to give collateral litigants access to
discovery in the absence of substantial prejudice to the party
opposed to the modification.325 This modification-friendly
approach considers the same interests as the Martindell court but
accords them different importance.326
Instead of presuming the harm done to parties who allegedly
rely on later-modified protective orders, the Wilk court requires a
party resisting sharing via a modification to demonstrate actual
harm from reliance or other prejudice.327 At the same time, the
Wilk test accords proper weight to the benefits of shared
discovery by placing a thumb on that end of the scale. This proofbased approach to reliance reasonably balances the interests at
stake.
A liberal modification regime also complements the current
proposed amendments to the civil rules. When litigants in
collateral cases modify a protective order and receive discovery
under the modification, the discovery process is aided in
collateral courts. Litigants receiving shared discovery information
are in a better position to understand the benefits of potential
discovery requests and to tailor them accordingly.328 Like any
325. See Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299–1300 (7th Cir. 1980)
(explaining that the presumption for public access to pretrial discovery “should
operate with all the more force when litigants . . . use discovery in aid of
collateral litigation on similar issues” because “access in such cases materially
eases the tasks of courts . . . and speeds up . . . a lengthy process”), superseded
by rule as stated in Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 2009).
326. See State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Manners, 239 S.W.3d 583, 587–88
(Mo. 2007). The Manners court has recognized a third strand, in addition to the
Martindell and Wilk tests, in the modification standard fight. See id. (“Arguably,
the standards recognize the same controlling criteria and differ only in the
weight that should be given to the criteria in their balancing.”).
327. See Wilk, 635 F.2d at 1301 (concluding that due to the “close similarity”
between the actions the “State is presumptively entitled to access to all of the
Wilk discovery on the same terms as the Wilk plaintiff”).
328. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (“[T]he burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the
case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the
issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving
the issues.”); see also COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 80 (showing
committee’s suggested amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 regarding
proportionality in discovery).
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form of discovery sharing, sharing through protective-order
modifications has the potential to reduce oft-repeating discovery
litigation in repeating cases.
C. Proportionality and Sharing
Although sharing does work in tandem with proportionality
to streamline discovery, the relationship has its limits. For
instance, shared discovery does not provide an independent
ground for courts and litigants to employ the proportionality
concept to limit discovery in most instances. At first glance,
shared discovery from a previous or contemporaneous case might
potentially be a “more convenient, less burdensome” source of
information.329 Moreover, shared discovery from another case
might reduce the “importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues.”330 Shared discovery in the possession of a requesting
party almost certainly does not preclude similar discovery in the
party’s own case based on these provisions in their current or
amended form.
Despite the intuitive appeal of the argument, no
commentators and few courts have directly addressed the
question. Courts have, however, regularly addressed the closely
related question of whether litigants may request information
from another party when the requestor already has the
information in her possession.331 And they have routinely allowed
such discovery.332
For example, courts should seldom disallow the deposition of
a witness in a case just because that witness has previously been
deposed in another case, even though that deposition has been
shared.333 The re-deposition of the witness should be allowed
329. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i).
330. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
331. See, e.g., Wilson Land Corp. v. Smith Barney, Inc., 48 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
1297, 1302 (E.D.N.C. 2000) (“The mere fact that the matters regarding which
discovery is sought happen to be within the knowledge of the moving party is
not usually grounds for objection . . . .”).
332. Id.; Weiner v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 624, 625 (S.D. Fla.
1977).
333. Cf. Hoh Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 87-0274 RCL, 1991 WL
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because, particularly with party witnesses, litigants in the
current case are entitled to know that the party’s contentions at
deposition are based on current information for the current
case.334 Indeed, discovery is not limited to just an investigation of
facts; another important purpose of discovery is to ascertain the
parties’ contentions about the facts, claims, and defenses.335 Over
time, parties can subtly shift their positions or give a different
version of the facts. Memories change.
Different advocates advancing different claims ask different
questions. Forcing litigants to rely on potentially outdated
depositions to ascertain the current case’s factual and legal
posture would undermine the quality of fact finding at trial.
Thus, there is substantial necessity for the deposition in the
second case, and even though there is substantial subject-matter
overlap, the deposition is not, in any way that is cognizable by
Rule 26, “duplicative” or “cumulative” or even “available” from a
less costly source.
The same logic should also apply when the form of discovery
is dependent on written questions and a potentially variable
party response.336 Over time, circumstances, along with claims
and defenses, change. Litigants should have the benefit of their
own questions and the responses that flow from them. Requests
for admissions provide an apt example. Asking someone to admit
a fact or position presumes that the person asking has some
previous knowledge on which to base the question.337 Even if that
229948, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 1991) (holding re-deposition allowed in light of
changed legal circumstances after remand).
334. See id. (stating that the proposition that a court may not “‘prohibit the
taking of a deposition altogether . . . absent extraordinary circumstances’”
applies “even when the party seeking discovery wishes to take a second
deposition of the same individual”).
335. See 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 2014 (observing that the rule
prohibiting discovery of matters within knowledge of requesting party “could
hardly apply to discovery under the federal rules, since the purpose of the
discovery rules is not only to elicit unknown facts, but also to narrow and define
the issues”).
336. See, e.g., United States v. 58.16 Acres of Land, 66 F.R.D. 570, 573 (E.D.
Ill. 1975) (holding that interrogatories are proper even when inquiring party
already has knowledge).
337. See 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 160, § 2014 (“[T]he very existence of a
request–for–admission procedure, which often implies some knowledge on the
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knowledge flows from shared discovery, courts should not
preclude discovery as disproportionate.
Proportionality may, however, provide a mechanism to
preclude re-discovery of information in some very limited
circumstances. For instance, courts may decide that identical
requests, including requests to which responses would not change
from case to case, are “duplicative” or “cumulative” or simply not
necessary in light of the burden of producing information that
overlaps with already shared discovery.338 But this is a principle
of limited applicability.
Seldom will requests or responses be identical, or virtually
so, even in similar cases. The facts of each case, and the parties’
contentions and shading of the facts in each case, will almost
necessarily vary. The particular benefits of discovery for the
current case must, in most cases, be weighed anew against the
burdens of production despite the existence of shared responses
from a previous case.339 Thus, while sharing supports
proportionality through the better exercise of attorney discretion,
the practice is not an independent ground to limit discovery
under the current or amended proportionality rules.
Instead of providing a basis to forbid discovery, sharing
allows litigants to more carefully and thoughtfully employ
proportional discovery requests. Instead of searching in the dark
with unfocused discovery requests, attorneys can target
particularly beneficial information based on their knowledge of
other discovery productions in similar cases. This increased
accuracy reduces both the volume of discovery requests and
potential litigation about those requests stemming from wellfounded or unfounded objections. In many instances, faced with
part of the requesting party of the matters covered by the requests for
admissions, shows that knowledge is no bar to use of the tools authorized by
Rules 26 to 36.”).
338. 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 136, ¶ 26.41[13] (“A court will nevertheless
limit discovery of matters known to the discovering party when the discovery
appears to serve no purpose . . . .”).
339. See Wiwa v. Shell Petrol. Dev. Co. of Nigeria Ltd., 335 F. App’x 81, 84
(2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the district court committed clear error by granting
a Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) request to limit discovery because of availability of
discovery in related cases when previous discovery was inadequate to address
issues in present case).
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the choice between drafting requests for information already in
their possession (and potentially litigating objections to those
requests), litigants may well exercise their discretion to rely on
shared information.
V. Conclusion
Many courts have long recognized the benefits of discovery
sharing, despite the fact that over thirty years of procedural
reform aimed at improving discovery have ignored it. Partially as
a result of this inattention, courts remain divided in their
approach to the issue. Litigants and the court system suffer as a
result. Preferring upfront sharing provisions and making later
modifications easier would be steps consistent with the spirit and
letter of current procedural reform. On balance, sharing makes
courts more efficient, more transparent, and more effective at
finding the truth. Courts operating within the discretion afforded
by Rule 26(c), and similar state rules, should exercise their power
to reap these benefits.

